

2400
ARISTOTLE



CIIF



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Cultural Organization



**UNIVERSITY
OF BUCHAREST**
VIRTUTE ET SAPIENTIA

- UNESCO Chair in
- Inter-cultural and Inter-religious Exchanges
- University of Bucharest, Romania



The International Conference

2400
ARISTOTLE

**UNIVERSITY OF BUCHAREST
FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY
NOVEMBER 25-26, 2016**

**editors
SAVU TOTU
OANA ȘERBAN**

EDITURA UNIVERSITĂȚII DIN BUCUREȘTI

The International Conference



University of Bucharest
Faculty of Philosophy
November 25-26, 2016

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Faculty of Philosophy
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OANA ȘERBAN**

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Organizers



THE UNIVERSITY OF BUCHAREST THE FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY

CIIF

THE RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE HISTORY AND CIRCULATION OF PHILOSOPHICAL IDEAS



United Nations
Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization



UNIVERSITY
OF BUCHAREST
— VIRTUTE ET SAPIENTIA —

- UNESCO Chair in
- Inter-cultural and Inter-religious Exchanges
- University of Bucharest, Romania
-

THE UNESCO CHAIR IN INTER-CULTURAL AND INTER-RELIGIOUS EXCHANGES,
UNIVERSITY OF BUCHAREST, ROMANIA

From the Desk of Organizing Committee

The Registration Desk will be open:

- On Friday, 8.30-10.00
- On Saturday, 8.30-10.00

An information desk will remain open through the conference.



Conference Presentation

The Faculty of Philosophy, University of Bucharest, organizes **the International Conference 2400ARISTOTLE**.

This conference is one of the academic events celebrating the Aristotle Anniversary Year, declared by the General Conference of UNESCO to internationally promote the work of Aristotle and his highly influential contribution to shaping modern Western civilization.

The aim of the conference is to revisit both Aristotle's work in different areas of philosophy and science (200 treatises, of which 31 have survived) as well as its subsequent reception. We welcome papers discussing Aristotelian contributions to logic, metaphysics, ethics, politics, arts, poetics or science.

The conference will be structured in the following thematic panels:

1. Metaphysics and Theology
2. Logic and Philosophy of Science
3. Ethics and Political Philosophy
4. Aesthetics, Rhetoric, Poetics
5. Aristotle and his reception
6. Aristotle and Phenomenology
7. Aristotle in Romanian Philosophy

Scientific Committee

- Gheorghe VLĂDUȚESCU (Romanian Academy)
- Mircea DUMITRU (University of Bucharest and Romanian Academy)
- Valentin MUREȘAN (University of Bucharest)
- Savu TOTU (University of Bucharest)
- Constantin STOENESCU (University of Bucharest)
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- Dan CHIȚOIU (Al. Ioan Cuza, University of Iași)
- Daniela JALOBEANU (Research Institute of the University of Bucharest)
- Cristian IFTODE (University of Bucharest)
- Bogdan MINCĂ (University of Bucharest)

Organizing Committee

- Acad. Gheorghe VLADUȚESCU
- Prof. Dr. Mircea DUMITRU
- Prof. Dr. Valentin MUREȘAN
- Prof. Dr. Romulus BRÂNCOVEANU
- Prof. Dr. Savu TOTU
- Drd. Oana ȘERBAN

Programme

Friday – November 25

8.30-10.00

Registration of participants

9.30-10.00

OPENING SESSION, Amf. Mircea Florian (M.F.)

Welcome speech

Dean, Professor Romulus Brâncoveanu,
Faculty of Philosophy, University of Bucharest

PLENARY SESSION (EN) Amphitheatre Mircea Florian

10.00-11.00

Keynote Speaker: MIRCEA DUMITRU

Minister for Education and Research (Romania); Professor, University of Bucharest, Faculty of Philosophy

Aristotle's Theory of Syllogism

Chair: ROMULUS BRÂNCOVEANU (University of Bucharest, Faculty of Philosophy)

11.00-11.15

Coffee Break

PARALLEL SESSIONS 11.15-13.15 / 11.15-13.45

Panel 1. METAPHYSICS AND THEOLOGY (EN) (11.15-13.15) <i>Chair: Cristian Iftode (Romania) – Room 6 Constantin Noica</i>		
John Dudley	Belgium	The Theology of Aristotle's Ethical and Political Treatises
Mugurel Păvăluță	Germany	Central influence points of Aristotle's philosophy on the scholastic theology of Thomas Aquinas
Sebastian Mateiescu	Romania	Aristotle's <i>Categories</i> in Byzantium: Existence in a Subject vs. <i>Enhypostasos</i>
Georgiana Huian	Romania	The Peculiarity of the Active Intellect in Aristotle's <i>De Anima</i> III.5

Panel 2. LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE (EN) (11.15-13.45)**Chair: Alexandru Dragomir (Romania) – Room 1**

Laurențiu Stăicu	Romania	What's still important in Aristotle's theory of categories?
Therrien Lynn Valerie	Canada	Wittgenstein and ἀπειριον in mathematics
Constantin Brîncuș	Romania	A Metalogical Argument for Aristotle's Thesis
Murat Kelikli	Turkey	From λόγος to πρότασις. Starting with Aristotle's Syllogism
Crina Galiță	Romania	Aristotelian logic and Arabic logicians. A means of Aristotle's reception in the Arabic classical logic

Panel 3. ETHICS (EN) (11.15-13.15)**Chair: Emilian Mihailov (Romania) – Room 8 Tudor Vianu**

Laurențiu Gheorghe	Romania	Aristotle on Democracy. The Case of Populism Nowadays
Anastasia Zakariadze	Georgia	Aristotle and Anthim Iverianul: Two Ethical Discourses
Dorina Pătrunsu	Romania	Inclusive or Dominant Scope? An Analytical Approach of Aristotle's <i>Eudaimonia</i>
Demuri Jalagonia	Georgia	Dilemma of Ancient Political Discuss and the Essence of Aristotelian <i>Zoon Politikon</i>

PANEL 3. POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (EN) (11.15-13.15)**Chair: Constantin Vică (Romania) – Amphitheatre Mircea Florian**

Vihren Buzov & Pepa Petkova	Bulgaria	Aristotle and the Specific Duality of Legal Argumentation
David Schaffler	Poland	Aristotle – Marx – Castoriadis: The Construction of Social Concepts
Jose Maria Carabante	Spain	The Aristotelian Concept of Nature: The Bridge between Ontology and Politics
Radu Uszkai	Romania	Aristotle and Cognitive Enhancement: Between Democracy and Epistocracy

Panel 4. METAPHYSICS AND CONTEMPORARY RECEPTIONS (RO) (11.15-13.15)**Chair: Savu Totu (Romania) – Conference Hall**

Viorel Vizureanu	Romania	Two models of Knowledge, Aristotelian and Cartesian, inspired by an idea of Ortega Y Gasset / Două modele ale cunoașterii, aristotelician și cartezian. Pornind de la o idee a lui Ortega y Gasset
Romulus Brâncoveanu	Romania	Aristotle as a Political Philosopher / Aristotel ca filosof politic
Sebastian Grama	Romania	On the Stage / Fiind pe scenă

13.15-14.30**LUNCH****PLENARY SESSION (RO)****Amphiteatre Mircea Florian****14.30-15.30****Keynote speaker:** Acad. GHEORGHE VLĂDUȚESCU

Romanian Academy; Professor, University of Bucharest, Faculty of Philosophy

Aristotle vs. Plato**Chair:** SAVU TOTU (University of Bucharest, Faculty of Philosophy)**15.30-15.45****Coffee Break**

PARALLEL SESSIONS
15.45-17.45 / 15.45-18.15

Panel 1. METAPHYSICS. ARISTOTLE AND HIS RECEPTIONS (EN) (15.45-17.45)

Chair: Oana Șerban (Romania) – Conference Hall

Jacob Greenstine	USA	On the Several Senses of Not-Being in Aristotle
Ionas Ciurlionis	Lithuania	The Concept of Four Elements in Aristotelian <i>Physics</i>
Cristian Iftode	Romania	Aristotle's Approach to Metaphor: Cognitive, yet 'Non-cognitive'
Valerian Ramishvili	Georgia	Heidegger, Plato and Aristotle – A New Talk on Being

Panel 2. LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE (EN) (15.45-18.15)

Chair: Laurențiu Staicu (Romania) – Amfiteatre Mircea Florian

Yusuf Daşdemir	Turkey	Avicenna on the Two <i>Barbaras</i> : A new Reading of Modal Propositions in Terms of Subjects
Mihai Cernea	Romania	What is a Biological Explanation? Between Aristotle and Darwin
Gaetano Albergo	Italy	Comparative Anatomy and Semeiotic Inferences in the <i>Historia Animalium</i>
Ivan Petrișor & Filip Rossi	Romania	Some Things Never Change: The Existential Fallacy and Definite Descriptions
Latinov Evgeni	Bulgaria	Aristotle and Zeno's Paradoxes

Panel 3. ETHICS AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (EN) (15.45-18.15)

Chair: Emanuel Socaciu (Romania) – Room 8 Tudor Vianu

Emilian Mihailov & Constantin Vică	Romania	Social Robots as Moral Companions. On Extending Aristotle's Conception of Friendship
Inamura Kazatuka	Japan	The Eleatic Stranger's Method in Aristotle's <i>Eudemian Ethics</i>
Florin Prună	Romania	Can the Vicious be Friends?
Manik Konch	India	Habit and Moral Character: An Analysis from Aristotle's Moral Philosophy

Panel 5. ARISTOTLE AND ITS RECEPTIONS (RO) (15.45-17.45)

Chair: Mihaela Pop (Romania) – Room 6 Constantin Noica

Andrei Bereschi	Romania	The Reception of Aristotle's Political Morphology: Albert the Great and Toma d'Aquino / Receptarea morfologiei politice la Albert cel Mare și Toma d'Aquino
Ioana Cristina Nicolae	Romania	Actuality and Potentiality in C.G. Jung's Psychoanalysis / Actualitate și potențialitate în psihanaliza lui C.G. Jung
Adelaida Petrancu	Romania	Potentiality, Actuality and Genius / Potență, actul și omul de geniu
Victor Gealan	Romania	Aristotle on Happiness and Contemplation / Despre fericire și contemplare la Aristotel

19:00

DINNER (Buffet & Cocktail), *Filos Pub* (Splaiul Independenței, 204, near the Faculty of Philosophy)

Saturday – November 26

8.30-10.00

Registration of participants

PLENARY SESSION (EN) Amphitheatre Mircea Florian

10.00-11.00

Keynote speaker: VALENTIN MUREȘAN

Honorary Director of the Research Center of Applied Ethics and of the Romanian Journal of Analytic Philosophy, Distinguished Research Fellow of Oxford Uehiro Center for Practical Ethics, Professor, University of Bucharest, Faculty of Philosophy

The Composite Interpretation of Happiness

Chair: EMANUEL SOCACIU (University of Bucharest, Faculty of Philosophy)

11.00-11.15

Coffee Break

PARALLEL SESSIONS 11.15-13.45

Panel 1. METAPHYSICS AND THEOLOGY (RO) (11.15-13.45) <i>Chair: Savu Totu (Romania) – Amphitheatre Mircea Florian</i>		
Alex Mihăilă	Romania	How Aristotelian was the exegetical school of Antioch? / Cât de aristoteliciană era școala exegetică din Antiohia?
Ștefan Ionescu Berechet	Romania	Aristotle within the Byzantine Iconoclastic Dispute / Aristotel în disputa iconoclastă bizantină
Adrian Carabă	Romania	Rejection of Aristotle's criticism to Plato's theory of ideas in <i>De Differentiis</i> by Georgios Gemistos Plethon / Respingerea criticii lui Aristotel la teoria ideilor a lui Platon în lucrarea <i>De Differentiis</i> a lui Gheorghe Gemistos Plethon (c.1355-1452)
Marian Vild	Romania	"The wisdom of men" and "The mysterious wisdom of God": Aristotle and St. Paul / „Înțelepciunea oamenilor” și „înțelepciunea de taină a lui Dumnezeu”: Aristotel și Sf. Ap. Pavel
Gheorghe Ciascai	Romania	Aristotelian Influences in Leibniz's Logics / Influențe aristotelice în logica lui Leibniz

Panel 1. METAPHYSICS AND THEOLOGY (EN) (11.15-13.00) <i>Chair: Daniel Nica (Romania) – Room 1</i>		
Saime Hizir	Turkey	Essence and Existence in Aristotle and Avicenna: Identification or Separation
Dan Chițoiu	Romania	Gregory Palamas' use of Aristotle
Atanase Barna	Romania	Aristotelian <i>ἐξίς</i> vs. patristic <i>ἐξίς</i> . Interpretation models of <i>ἐξίς</i> in patristic contexts and their final purpose: the theological discourse about divinization

Panel 2. LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE (EN) (11.15-13.45)		
Chair: Constantin Brîncuș (Romania) – Conference Hall		
Constantin Stoenescu	Romania	The Aristotelean essential explanation and its challenges
Gheorghe Ștefanov	Romania	Aristotle and the Dependence of Rational Action on Knowledge
Cătălin Partenie	Romania	Truth and Opinion on Aristotle
Alexandru Dragomir	Romania	Is Kripke's semantics for Quantified Modal Logic committed to Aristotelian essentialism?
Diana Ghinea	Romania	Aristotle and Kant on the Knowledge of Nature

Panel 4. AESTHETICS. RETHORICS. POETICS. (EN) (11.15-13.45)		
Chair: Andrei Simionescu-Panait (Romania) – Amphitheatre Constantin Rădulescu Motru		
Ahmed Sabeen	USA	The Genesis of Secular Politics in Medieval Political Thinking: The King of Averroes and the Emperor of Dante
Oana Șerban	Romania	The Puzzle of Aristotelian Elements in Foucault's Critique on the History of the Desiring Man and the Aesthetics of Existence
Cornel Moraru	Romania	<i>Mimesis</i> and <i>Physis</i> in Aristotle's thinking. Human's mimetic nature
Raluca Oancea	Romania	From Aristotle's <i>Scala Naturae</i> to Post human aesthetics
Mihaela Pop	Romania	Actuality of Aristotelian aesthetic concepts in contemporary philosophical thought – A case study: performance art

Panel 6. ARISTOTLE AND PHENOMENOLOGY (EN) (11.15-13.15)		
Chair: Alexandru Bejinariu (Romania) – Room 3		
Bogdan Mincă	Romania	Heidegger's Interpretation of the Aristotelian <i>Poiesis</i> and of its Importance for the Preeminence of <i>Sophia</i> over <i>Phronesis</i>
Vasil Dinev Penchev	Bulgaria	Heidegger's Comment on Aristotle's <i>Physics</i>
Ion Tănăsescu	Romania	The Aristotelian Polysemy of Being in Franz Brentano's Dissertation and the Origins of Intentionality
Ileana Borțun	Romania	The Existential Status of Friendship. A Phenomenological Perspective on Aristotle's <i>Philia</i>

Panel 7. ARISTOTLE IN ROMANIAN PHILOSOPHY (RO) (11.15-13.45)		
Chair: Mihai-Dragoș Vădăna (Romania) – Room 2		
Marin Diaconu	Romania	Moments and meanings of the presence of Aristotle's works in the history of Romanian philosophy / Momente și semnificații ale prezenței operei lui Aristotel în istoria filosofiei românești
Viorel Cernica	Romania	Research of Syllogism in Romanian Philosophy / Cercetarea silogismului în filosofia românească
Radu Gheorghe	Romania	<i>Zoon politikon</i> and the subjective welfare / <i>Zoon politikon</i> și bunăstarea subiectivă
Alexandru Buican	Romania	Reception of Aristotle's works in Interwar Romanian thinking/ Receptarea operei lui Aristotel în gândirea românească interbelică
Titus Lateș	Romania	Aristotle and the Hermes's logic/ Aristotel și logica lui Hermes

13.45-15.00

LUNCH

PLENARY SESSION (EN)
Amphitheatre Mircea Florian

15.00-16.00

Keynote speaker: FRANZ-LOTHAR ALTMANN

German Institute for International and Security Affairs / Associate Professor at the UNESCO Chair in Inter-cultural and Inter-religious Exchanges, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Bucharest UNESCO

Aristotle and Significances of his Political Philosophy for Today

Chair: CRISTIAN IFTODE (University of Bucharest, Faculty of Philosophy)

16.00-16.15

Coffee Break

PARALLEL SESSIONS
16.15-18.15 / 16.15-18.45

PANEL 1. METAPHYSICS (RO) (16.15-18.45)		
Chair: Oana Șerban (Romania) – Amphitheatre Mircea Florian		
Alexandru Boboc	Romania	Aporetics and Dialectics : Aristotle and Nicolai Hartmann / Aporetica și dialectica la Aristotel și Nicolai Hartmann
Ion Bănșoiu	Romania	Aristotle's Divisions of Science / Clasificarea științelor la Aristotel
Dragoș Popescu	Romania	Neo-aristotelianism at Princely Academies of Bucharest and Jassy / Neoaristotelismul Academiiilor Domnești din București și Iași
Marin Bălan	Romania	Medieval Interpretations of Aristotle's <i>Categories</i> . The Case of Thoma de Aquino / Interpretarea <i>Categoriilor</i> lui Aristotel în Evul Mediu. Cazul lui Thoma de Aquino
Savu Totu	Romania	Thought, Language and Aristotle's Metaphysics / Gândire, limbă și metafizica lui Aristotel

PANEL 3. ETHICS AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (EN) (16.15-18.15)		
Chair: Radu Uszkai (Romania) – Amphitheatre Constantin Rădulescu Motru		
Mihaela Constantinescu	Romania	Where is Aristotle When We Need Him? On the Very Grounds of Ascribing Moral Blame to Individual and Corporate Agents
Segev Mor	USA	Aristotle on Group Agency
Ana Bazac	Romania	Aristotle, The Names of Vices and Virtues: What is the Criterion of Quantitative Evaluation of the Moral Behaviour?
Costin Lianu	Romania	Aristotelian semantics, <i>homo economicus</i> , images and brands

PANEL 3. ETHICS AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (EN) (16.15-18.45)		
Chair: Valentin Mureșan (Romania) – Conference Hall		
Dentsoras Dimitrios	Canada	Aristotle on Craft and Virtue
Andreea Eșanu	Romania	Remarks on Aristotle's Notion of Virtue
Iovan Drehe	Romania	The Role of Dialectic in Aristotle's Discussion of Political Regimes
Daniel Nica	Romania	Was Aristotle a Moral Particularist?
Ben Carlo Atim & Jay-Pee Pena	Philippines	Akratic Homosexuality

Panel 6 ARISTOTLE AND PHENOMENOLOGY (EN) (16.15-18.15)		
Chair: Bogdan Mincă (Romania) – Room 3		
Remus Breazu	Romania	Phenomenological Approach to Aristotle's Concept of Priority
Andrei Simionescu-Panait	Romania	Retracing phantasy in Aristotle's notion of self-movement
Alexandru Bejinariu	Romania	Between <i>logos</i> and <i>phōnē</i> . The Question of the Animal in Martin Heidegger's Reading of Aristotle
Călin Ștefan	Romania	Heidegger's Hermeneutics of Aristotle's Physics

Panel 7. ARISTOTLE IN ROMANIAN PHILOSOPHY (RO) (16.15-18.15)		
Chair : Viorel Cernica (Romania) – Room 2		
Gheorghe Tarara	Romania	Anton Dumitriu on the Metaphysical Foundations of Aristotle's Logics / Temeiuri metafizice ale logicii aristotelice în viziunea lui Anton Dumitriu
Mihai Popa	Romania	The Concept of <i>Entelehia</i> in Blaga's perspective. Elements of Historical Anthropology / Conceptul de <i>entelehie</i> la Blaga. Elemente de antropologie istorică
Constantin Aslam	Romania	Between the Ares's logic and Hermes's logic. Constantin Noica: an Aristotelian? / Între logica lui Ares și logica lui Hermes. Constantin Noica: un aristotelician?
Mihai Dragoș Vadana	Romania	Mircea Florian's notion of recessivity. A Romanian contribution to the Aristotelian topos of post-predicament / Noțiunea de recesivitate a lui Mircea Florian. O contribuție românească la topos-ul aristotelic al postpredicamentelor/

Friday, 25 November

DUDLEY JOHN. *The Theology of Aristotle's Ethical and Political Treatises.* Aristotle tells that the ideal life is an imitation of the life of God: "Let us then take it as agreed between us that each man attains as much happiness as he attains virtue, practical wisdom and action according to these, using as evidence God, who is happy and blessed due to no external goods, but due to himself and by being of a certain quality in his nature..."¹ Five aspects of Aristotle's God are found in NE, namely God's intellectual nature, contemplative activity, happiness, pleasure, and goodness. Aristotle tells us that perfect human happiness deriving from the intellectual activity of contemplation has God's contemplation as its model. Aristotle believes that God has pleasure, although Plato had rejected this view, and he also expressly compares the best human pleasure with that of God. Although Aristotle rejects Plato's Idea of the Good, his God is nonetheless the paradigm of goodness. A sixth attribute of God is found in EE, namely immobility. God's activity of contemplation is an activity of immobility: EE I, vii, 1217 a 32-4; EE VI (= NE VII) xiv, 1154 b 26-8; cf. EE IV (= NE V), vii, 1134 b 28-9; Pol. VII, iii, 1325 b 23-32. God's immobility, which is an attribute derived from his activity of contemplation, is likewise a model for the stability of the ideal man, who requires leisure and permanence as characteristics of his ideal activity of contemplation. God's immobility is also of great significance in Pol., as it is a model for the highly important topic of the stability of the state. A seventh attribute of God – that of self-sufficiency – is found in EE and MM, but not in NE.² This self-sufficiency of God is also a model for the self-sufficiency of Aristotle's ideal man and state. It might appear, therefore, that Aristotle's God exercises final causality on the ideal man and state and that his teleology is not limited to final causality in the field of physics.

¹ Pol. VII, i, 1323 b 21-6.

² EE VII, xii, 1244 b 7-8; MM II, xv, 1212 b 33 – 1213 a 8. Cf. Dirlmeier, *Eudemische Ethik*...456: "Mit MM teilt sie [sc. EE], und dies ist bei entwicklungsgeschichtlicher Betrachtung wichtig, die Einbeziehung des Gottes-Arguments, die in beiden Ethiken nicht en passant, sondern mit kräftiger Akzentuierung erfolgt."

PĂVĂLUCĂ MUGUREL. *Central influence points of Aristotle's philosophy on the scholastic theology of Thomas Aquinas.*

The Platonic interpretation of St. Augustine on Christian philosophy defined Christian thinking over the centuries until the Middle Ages. Up to the late 12th century Aristotle was not very known in the Christian space, but only through a few writings about logics. The facing with his metaphysical works appear with the 12th century through Arab-Jewish philosophy and the direct translation of the Greek original works. In this context Thomas Aquinas will be acquainted with the works and the thinking of the ancient philosopher in the first half of the 13th century. Thus, while medieval Christianity was marked by the Platonic and Neo-Platonic constant thoughts that the being of ideas was the only real one and the experience of the concrete world was just a transitional image with "taste of nothingness", Thomas Aquinas discovered in the philosophy of Aristotle the possibility of approaching truth and being through the sensible world, consequently marking a new beginning in the scholastic epistemology, which was to start out from the human ratio and the value of the sensitive world up to the knowledge of the divine. The originality of Aquinas's theology puts on the Aristotelian thinking structure, claiming, contrary to the Christian world marked by the platonic environment, a consistent trust in the autonomy and own value of the sensible world. This new understanding proposes the leaving of the old thought about the sensorial world of nothingness and asserts the possibility of knowing the truth through the sensible world. In this context Thomas Aquinas approaches, under Aristotelian influence, a completely different anthropological understanding, by attributing to the human being new epistemological characteristics and potencies. The new qualities of the human being appear at Thomas in the context of a novel comprehension of the connection between human soul and body, which are now in an interior and interdependent relation, whereas the soul constitutes the essential form of the body. Consequently the human being represents for the scholastic theologian a psychosomatic unit and a whole.

Thus, in the theology of Thomas Aquinas one should ascertain the connection between the scientific categories, also the logical methods of Aristoteles, and the Christian principles. Therefore, we find at the scholastic theologian Aristotelian terms, such as analogia entis, substance or essence, accident, etc., loaded with meanings and contents of Christian theology, such as Trinity or Eucharist. In this respect, we can say, without claiming an exhaustive treatment and only within the given theme, that the intent of our presentation is to capture the decisive points of Aristotle's influence on Aquinas.

MATEIESCU SEBASTIAN. *Aristotle's Categories in Byzantium: Existence in a Subject vs. Enhypostasos.*

Aristotle's *Categories* offered us one important definition of "existence in a subject": By "in a subject" Aristotle understood something which can be "(i) not as a part and (ii) cannot exist separately from what it is in" (*Cat.* 1a24-5). A subject then must have no parts for that would make the subject somehow dependent on his parts whereas the Aristotelian subject is the paradigm of independent existence. Almost all commentators received this axiom without questioning it. Yet, this paper argues the reception of that thesis in Byzantium was rather critical. The rationale offered here is that the Byzantine Christological debates on

the relationship between the two natures of Christ and his unique *hypostasis* which took place during the sixth and seventh centuries proposed a model of “existence in a subject” which contradicted Aristotle’s. The solution of the Byzantines was to consider human nature as a part of the whole in which the divine subject exists, without however making the subject dependent on its parts. Important figures of this trend such as Leontius of Byzantium and Maximus the Confessor described this as being the *enhypostasiatio* of the human nature in the divine subject and the main goal of this paper is to analyze to what extent this move interfered with Aristotle’s condition (i) for being in a subject “not as a part”.

H UIAN GEORGIANA. *The Peculiarity of the Active Intellect in Aristotle’s De Anima III.5.* Chapter 5 of *De anima* III has always been a source of astonishment and controversy due to the density of the tackled problems. The brevity of the explanations and arguments, compared to the importance of the notions presented here, added to the difficulty of an accurate understanding of this text. In my paper I would like to analyse the distinction between the passive intellect (ὁ παθητικὸς νοῦς) and the active or creative intellect (ὁ ποιητικὸς νοῦς), having in view Aristotle’s distinctions between material cause and efficient cause, and between potentiality and actuality. In the light of these distinctions, I will also examine the concept of productive intellect in *Metaphysics* VI (E) 1025b22. The comparison between the active intellect and the light (430a15) underlines its role as an agent: it brings the intelligible notions to act, which only existed in potentiality. Furthermore, I will analyse the specificity of the active intellect through its threefold qualification (430a17) as being separate from the body (cf. 429a11, 24), unaffected (cf. 429a15, b23) and pure or unmixed (cf. 429a18). The *topos* of the identification of the knowledge in act and its object will be compared to the considerations dedicated to the divine *nous* in *Metaphysics* XII (Λ) 1071b22, 1072a25, 1073a11. The fact that the active intellect is separate (χωρισθεὶς, 430a23) from the body can be connected to its purity and contributes to its being perfect and eternal. We would like to explore here the Aristotelic conception of the immortality of the soul as pure Intellect (which is “deathless and everlasting”, 430a23), and the union of the pure intellect to the absolute intellect, in parallel to other places that suggest the immortality of the soul such as *Metaphysics* XII (Λ) 1070a24. I would also like to see in what sense the active intellect can be equalled with the creative imagination. Finally I will explore the relationship between the active intellect and the memory, and I will see if we can speak of a dependency of the thinking activity on the creative *nous* or the passive *nous*, interpreting the cryptic phrase of 430a25.

S TAICU LAURENȚIU. *What’s still important in Aristotle’s theory of categories?* Almost any lengthy discussion of the metaphysical problem of categories starts with a respectful invocation of Aristotle’s theory, as the foundation of the categorial discourse. This attitude is, of course, completely justified, Aristotle being the first philosopher who developed a full-fledged theory of categories. However, beside this respectful attitude, few authors take his categorial discourse seriously today, the mainstream perspective being that there is nothing left there for a modern perspective on the issue. There are, of course, a few notable exceptions, Abraham Edel, for example, who argues that

Aristotle's theory of categories could be interpreted in such a way as to become a true foundation for a more experimental perspective on categories, and also for a new function of categories as exploratory concepts. In the present paper I would like to reinforce this perspective, and to argue that we are still in Aristotle's debt for a few important ideas regarding the role of categories in building a coherent and relevant metaphysical discourse. More precisely, beside his insistence on the overall importance of categories, Aristotle still remains to be taken seriously regarding the openness of categories list, and also concerning his methodological empiricism in exploring their explanatory virtues and organizing function.

T HERRIEN LYNN VALERIE. *Wittgenstein and ἄπειρον in mathematics.*

Wittgenstein's idiosyncratic take on mathematical infinity shall be shown to be a modern application of Aristotle's basic posits concerning the ontology of infinity. We shall show how a reading of Wittgenstein can help elucidate and clarify Aristotle's position on the notion of continuum (and viceversa). We hope to show not only that Aristotle's views on the subject are still relevant but that they also have potential applications to modern mathematical theory. To do so, we shall compare Wittgenstein's comments on infinity and the continuum in his *Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics and his Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics* to Aristotle's in Book III and V-VI of *Physics* as well as Book VI of the *Categories*. Aristotle concludes that the idea of a *possible* infinite divisibility of continuous magnitudes is not tantamount to implying an *actual* infinite divisibility; essentially, if a continuous magnitude can be divided at any given point, it cannot be divided at all points at the same time. The Aristotelian continuum is therefore irreducible to any other kind of structure, i.e., it is indecomposable neither into a) non-void parts lacking a common boundary ("indivisibles" or "atoms") nor b) void parts of extensionless magnitudes ("points"; for a point is nothing more than a cut in the line, mere accidents emerging from operations on magnitudes bearing no actual reality – they subsist only in a potential mode wherein the infinite division can never be completed to obtain the actual extensionless point).

Wittgenstein's view of the algorithmic nature of mathematics is directly linked to his anti-Platonic and anti-Cantorean stance against completed infinity. As such, his position on mathematical infinity is closely related to Aristotle's ἄπειρον which holds that the infinite is intrinsically in-complete. The logical syntax and conceptual analysis of "infinity" precludes any technical use other than as an adjective describing a potentially infinite mathematical process – the possibility of constructing infinitely many series through the deployment of a recursive rule. The concept of $\mathbb{R}$ as a continuous, gapless entity is thus borne out by a semantic and conceptual confusion: "[the] picture of the number line is an absolutely natural one up to a certain point; that is to say so long as it is not used for a general theory of real numbers", for "[the] straight line isn't « composed of points », the « mathematical rules are the points »".

B RÎNCUȘ CONSTANTIN. *A Metalogical Argument for Aristotle's Thesis.*

What is nowadays called *Aristotle's Thesis* is the idea that logical consequence has an essential modal ingredient, namely, it is not only truth-preserving, but it is *necessarily* truth-preserving. Aristotle clearly formulated this idea in his definition of syllogism: "a syllogism is a discourse in which, certain things being stated, something other than what is stated follows *of necessity* from their being so." (Prior Analytics, 24, 18-19; my emphasis) Many philosophers and logicians, however, criticized this thesis and the debate is still going on today. Bertrand Russell (1919), for instance, argued that since Philo of Megara's definition of logical consequence – according to which ϕ is a logical consequence of a set of statements Γ iff either some members of Γ are false or ϕ is true – captures the essential property of logical consequence, i.e., truth-preservingness, this definition is fully adequate and thus there is no need for an additional modal criterion. In the same line of thought, Alfred Tarski (1936) implicitly followed Philo's idea by avoiding the modal concepts in his semantic definition of logical consequence – according to which ϕ is a logical consequence of a set of statements Γ iff every model of Γ is also a model of ϕ . Of course, on the other side, both Russell's and Tarski's approaches received many criticisms (see Etchemendy 1990, McGee 1992, Prawitz 2005 et al.). The main aim of my presentation is to discuss a recent argument proposed by Ian Rumfitt (2015) according to which Lindenbaum-Scott Theorem offers a strong warrant for *Aristotle's Thesis*. In addition, I will explain how this theorem may help us in acquiring a clear cut understanding of Aristotle's distinction between relative and absolute necessity. Informally speaking, what Lindenbaum-Scott theorem states is that every implicative relation ($\Rightarrow$) is associated with a certain space ($\Pi \Rightarrow$), such that the conclusion of that implication is true at every member of that space at which all the premises are true. Closely analysed, the content of the theorem opens the way to the modal notions. With an accent on the notion of logical truth, the argument that I shall discuss could be briefly stated as follows:

- I.R._P1: Any implicative relation is associated with a related space $\Pi \Rightarrow$, such that this relation obtains if and only if truth is preserved at any member of $\Pi \Rightarrow$.
- I.R._P2: The members of $\Pi \Rightarrow$ may be thought as possibilities.
- I.R._P3: Any necessity operator generated by an implicative relation is normal with respect to that implicative relation, i.e., whenever $A_1, \dots, A_n \Rightarrow B$ we have $\Box \Rightarrow A_1, \dots, \Box \Rightarrow A_n \Rightarrow \Box \Rightarrow B$, and in particular whenever $\Rightarrow B$ we have $\Box \Rightarrow B$.
- I.R._P4: Logical truths follow from the empty set of premises.
- I.R._C: Logical truths are logically necessary.

K ELIKLI MURAT. *From λόγος to πρότασις; for to Begin Aristotle Syllogism.*

Aristotle has examined "*ἀπόφανσις*" in *De Interpretatione* and "*πρότασις*" in *Analytica Priora*, in order to examine how is possible their a correlation. In this regard, what corresponds to the proposed notions "proposition, statement, assertion, premise etc." is not clear in Aristotle's Syllogism. In this work, we will inquire these terms to comprehend how they are defined and how Aristotle addresses them different properties. We will try to give the English translation for them, in respect to their concepts in the English logic literature. As a result of this work, Aristotle's "*ἀπόφανσις*", will be considered as

“ἀπλῇ ἀπόφανσις”. This term is equivalent ‘πρότασις’. We believe that this correlation is important for to understand the Aristotle’s syllogism and ‘the essential transition from to *Analytica Priora* from *De Interpretatione*.

GHEORGHE LAURENȚIU. *Aristotle on Democracy. The Case of Populism Nowadays.*
Aristotle’s critique of democracy has a central point in the distorting influence of demagoguery on the decisions of the political assembly especially when leaders resort to the passions of the majorities. Recent developments of western politics show that his fears were still relevant to the current situation. The polarization between the rich and the poor is one of the main themes that the demagogues exploit in order to destroy democracy seen as common project to preserve the unity and thus the freedom of the state. The absence of a middle class or the presence of a very small one is a factor that creates factions and foments revolutions. Aristotle favours a practical solution as opposed to an institutional one to solve this problem, since he is well aware of the limits of institutions, understood as regulations, written law, to achieve such ends, but can the use of practical wisdom be a solution when it can also be subjected, in both ancient modern and circumstances, to the pressure of populism?

ZAKARIADZE ANASTASIA. *Aristotle and Anthim Iverianul: Two Ethical Discourses.*
An easy, but accurate way of distinguishing the ethical discourse of Aristotle from that of Anthim Iverianul’s lies in discussing the essential questions they put forward. The ethical discourse of Aristotle has an explicitly teleological character. He is not interested in acts, correct in themselves, regardless of any reasons, but acts aimed at achieving virtue. Anything that helps to achieve this benefit or purpose is right; all that prevents the attainment of the true good – is wrong. On the valley of that discourse innate virtues are denied; virtues are associated with socially significant acts. The main goal of ethics is to teach how to become happy. So, for Aristotle’s virtue ethics human is a social being; who should live a life of virtue in accordance with reason; and that his/her end is happiness. Anthim Iverianul’s ethical discourse may be called classical absolutism; in its essence it is frankly deontological one. Human is simultaneously an unique individual as well as a socially responsible being. For Anthim man is a *person*; and the main thing he/she essentially should do is *love*. The way man expresses love is through *virtue*. If man is bereft of virtue, he/she unable to express love. Anthim Iverianul in his sermons and other works argues that destiny is happiness (*beatitude*) that begins in this world, but is consummated with God. The difference between the ethical discourses of Aristotle and Anthim Iverianul also has to do with how virtue comes about. Virtue-*Arete*- for Aristotle, lies between two extremes. Aristotle links virtue to reason, and therefore is explicitly linked with human knowledge, Anthim – to love. His heritage underlines the importance of Charity as a cardinal virtue of Christian Ethics.

PĂTRUNSU DORINA. *Inclusive or dominant? An investigation the concept of happiness.*
 About *eudaimonia* or happiness Aristotle tells us, even from the beginning, that “any form of knowledge and any option the people can have tend toward a certain good” (1095a; 15) and that, concerning “the name, almost all the people agree, given that both the crowd and the elevate spirits, call it happiness and they believe that to live well and enjoy of succes are the same thing with being happy”(1095a, 20). So the philosopher finds some sort of consent both on the option and the action, and also of the opinion: all of us follow a certain good, and that good is called happiness. But, this way we did not say much about the nature of the happiness, how it is possible and in what it consists. In other words, if our investigation would stop here, we would not have anything else but a “formal happiness” (Gobry 1995), or an empty notion, without any content.

In the first Book, chapter 5, Aristotle gives us a first outline of the concept of happiness. Happiness, says Aristotle, is a way of life. As such, what are we looking for is something concrete, which can be found on the ground of being possible in practice, which means that it is something achievable, like any aim or purpose the people achieve in general. Happiness understood in this way, we have not anything else but many kinds of happiness, and not what it is.

So, what is the nature of happiness and how could Aristotle exit from the dilemma above? What kind of doctrine does he propose? Is it a “dominant” or an “inclusive” one? This is the problem I intend to follow in the paper. The thesis I try to submit is that Aristotle has an inclusive perspective of the happy life. The argument has several steps. First, I want to identify the nature of the happiness through the argumentation of Aristotle in the Book I and Book X. After that, I will bring into discussion some of the difficulties the commentators find in the Aristotelian proposal, which are in fact some difficulties about the inclusive interpretation of happiness. In the end, I will make some comments on so-called preeminence of contemplative life in achieving human happiness, and also about the importance Aristotle gives to the political life.

JALAGHONIA DEMURI. *Dilemma of Ancient Political Discuss and the Essence of Aristotelian Zoon Politikon.*

Several landmarked stages in the political discourse of Antiquity are distinguished. At an intial stage of the philosophical investigation, the human attempt is to explain the universe in which he lives, to reach to the secrets of nature – *φύσις*, of cosmos. Aristotle identifies physics – *φύσις* as the doctrine of the existing ones. FA In the second period of antique philosophy is determined by study of human being as a microcosm, his place and his attitude towards other persons. New thinking concepts come to the fore. Firstly, Socrates tried to turn the “*φύσις*” into the human knowledge. His major question was “Who am I and what is Human?” Diogenes Laertius began “Pole Life” sheltering in his barrel that from here he wants to demonstrate that wisdom and happiness belong to the man who is independent of society and state. He scorned political social organization, property rights and reputation. The barrel is a new mode of State created by him; he thinks that natural environment will help to escape from the governmental power. Plato analyzed the properties of the human soul: he underlined *Nous* as main differentiator of human being from other creatures has an ability of thinking and determination of outcomes of its actions. *Thumos* is the emotional

element in virtue of which we feel anger, fear, etc. To the third feature of the human soul – *epithumia* are ascribed bodily desires; here we can see the new phenomenology of power. It investigated the limits of human perfection. Aristotle set forth a new definition of a human being – “*Zoon Politicon*”. This can be interpreted as “a political anima” or “a social animal.” It is a starting point for a totally new discourse in political philosophy. Human being declared to be the only one who can carry out pole’s life, create and state rules, built up and live in political or civil society. This absolutely new definition underlines the essence of human being as a person of social-political dimension.

B UZOV VIHREN & PETKOVA PEPA. *Aristotle’s logic and the Specific Duality of Legal Argumentation.*

In the paper is justified the thesis that in Aristotle logic and in his theory of rhetoric of law we could find an inspiration to reveal the mutual dependence of the two aspects in legal reasoning and the essential connection of law and politics. In his conceptual scheme rhetoric could be an effective instrument in situations where the probable needs to be converted to be converted to a justified decision – whether someone is guilty or not or whether a specific course of politically significant action needs to be taken. This decision would be based on the capability to discover the underlying truth.

There are two aspects: objective and pragmatic – going to the making of legal argumentation. Search for material truth is the main task of judicial evidence and legal decision-making according to valid rules of procedure in the sense of deductive logic. It relies on established facts, and not only on interpretation, rhetorical figures, subjective opinions or language context. The second aspect of legal argumentation could be illustrated through all argumentative instruments used in trials. The results of court proceedings come as arguments in a reasoning game. Truth as a regulative principle and creativity are indispensable in court game. The pragmatic aspect concerns the effects of solution of legal conflicts.

The objective aspect reflects the consistency of the legal decision with the law and accepted juridical standards of reasoning. It is dominating and decisive for the rationality of legal argumentation. The pragmatic aspect expresses an accordance with moral values (natural law), cultural traditions and social benefits of finding reasonable solutions of legal conflicts. In practical sense it is realized through rhetorical arguments and creativity of thinking. It has moral, social and economic dimensions.

S CHAUFFLER DAVID. *Aristotle – Marx – Castoriadis: The Construction of Social Concepts.*

In the “Koinonia” section of *Crossroads in the Labyrinth* (*Les carrefours du labyrinthe*, 1978), Cornelius Castoriadis carries out a close reading of Marx’s discussion, in Volume I of *Capital*, of Aristotle’s discussion of equivalence in the *Nichomachean Ethics*. Castoriadis’s intention is, first, to show that Marx here repeats a confusion found throughout *Capital*, which is caused by overlaying a transhistorical use of a concept (in this case, that of labour) on an understanding of the same concept which is delineated by historical circumstance, and, second, to show that by so doing, Marx obscures the real insight of Aristotle’s equivalence argument. This insight, Castoriadis claims, is that the equivalence propounded in transactions neither inheres in the producers and their labour, nor is it to be deduced, historical

developments permitting, from a (labour) theory of value. Rather, it is a stipulation made in concert by the community: "This equating is the work of *nomos*, of the law, of the social-historical institution." (CitL, p. 278) In this way his discussion serves as an illustration of the key concept in Castoriadis's theory of social development and criticism, the social imaginary.

The present paper describes the passages in the *Nicomachean Ethics* that adumbrate the grounds and possibility of just exchange, and the uses made of them by Castoriadis in the work cited above and elsewhere, both to refute Marx's theory of value, and to support his own notion of the flexibility and perpetuity of concepts that are mediated by the social imaginary. Then, in order more fully to characterize this latter concept and the role that Castoriadis deems it to play in social critique, in particular, the paper analyzes Castoriadis's discussion of *On the Soul* which is undertaken in *The World in Fragments* (*Le monde morcelé*, 1990). The aim of the paper is to provide both a specific example, and a structural description, of the concept of the social imaginary, by showing how in the development and employment of this concept Castoriadis is deeply indebted to Aristotle.

CARABANTE JOSE-MARIA. *The Aristotelian Concept of Nature: The Bridge between Ontology and Politics.*

The Aristotelian philosophy covers a broad thematic content. Traditionally, the scholar have tended to make partial interpretations of his work. This has been generally in this way especially in relation to the political philosophy of Aristotle. Aristotle's political philosophy has been conceptualized both as a separate section of his metaphysics and as a contribution without much relevance in his others works. However, from the perspective of political philosophy, the main contribution of Aristotle cannot be understood without taking into account its ontological background. In the paper that I intend to defend, I will try to highlight the relationships between ontology and politics in the Aristotle's philosophy, that is, I will try to show how the reflection on the political regimes, citizenship and justice are rooted in their metaphysical conception. In particular I will argue that the semantic richness of the concept of Nature, a central concept for both ontology and politics or ethics, is the category that centralizes and harmonizes the various philosophical contributions of Aristotle.

On the base of Aristotelian work, I will do a reading that reveals the theoretical and practical dimension of his conception of nature. For Aristotle, the nature is a dynamic category in the study of being and it is a normative category in the political analysis. Especially I will consider the versatility of the concept nature as is explained in *Politics* and the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

As well as I will devote a section to reflect on the possibility of defend this category in the current philosophical context, given that in Aristotle's work "nature" does not have a dogmatic content. Finally a section of conclusions will be included.

USZKAI RADU. *Aristotle and Cognitive Enhancement: Between Democracy and Epistocracy.*³ With the current emergence of large-scale populist movements (either on the Left or on the Right side of the political spectrum) in well-established and (at least apparently) functional Western democracies, alongside irrational public and economic policies, the question of political ignorance is still one of great importance for democracies, either old, or new. In his dialogue *Gorgias*, Plato famously argued that a democratic rule of society would be defective because citizens are, on average, ignorant when it comes to politics: democracies adopt “policies based on the views of the ignorant masses and neglect the better-informed counsel of philosophers and other experts” (Somin 2013, 7).

Recent studies appear to confirm Plato’s harsh stance on how the average Joe thinks about international trade, vaccines or the banking and quantitative easing (Caplan 2006’ Somin 2013; Brennan 2016). Taking into account the fact that their single vote in an election has an infinitesimal chance of altering the result in a presidential election, it would be irrational for individuals, by and large, to become experts on matters of public policies. Therefore, being ignorant on this issues is, from an economic standpoint, the rational strategy to be adopted.

In recent years cognitive enhancement has been discussed as a potential solution to this issue and as a way of saving modern democracies (Savulescu & Persson 2012; Danaher 2016). My talk will revolve around whether or not it this would be, in Aristotelian terms an acceptable and ‘virtuous’ solution to our current democratic puzzle. Other alternative solutions will be also examined in terms of their Aristotelian acceptability: either a smaller government with less responsibilities and less chances in creating disastrous public policies (Somin 2013) or a form of libertarian epistocracy (Brennan 2016).

VIZUREANU VIOREL. *Two models of Knowledge, Aristotelian and Cartesian, inspired by an idea of Ortega Y Gasset / Două modele ale cunoașterii, aristotelician și cartezian.*

For Ortega y Gasset there are two fundamental ways of thinking in the history of philosophy, one Aristotelian and one Cartesian (or modern). But in his analysis of the former, Ortega y Gasset states that we could find also in Aristotle a primitive and a modern vein, corresponding to his main concepts, of substance (or „thing”) and respectively of analogy (or relation: *πρός τι*). Ortega y Gasset even appreciates that it would have taken very little to Aristotle to be fully situated in the modern era. Starting from this reflection, it is the aim of our paper to scrutinize the legitimacy of a closeness between Aristotelian and Cartesian ways of conceiving the relation between things, in other words to answer the question how much modern Aristotle is.

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G RAMA SEBASTIAN. *On the stage / Fiind pe scenă.*

Without Kafka, Don Quijote would have been much poorer. Our proposal is to move the Borgesian false paradox into the literary universe of a single author. Beyond any external constraints, we have to experience the reading of a sequence of Aristotelian works while also bearing in mind, as a premise (multiple in itself), another sequence. Specifically, the exercise consists in reading passages from the *Metaphysics* through the filter provided by some passages from the *Rhetoric*. Thus, methodically suspending the “traditional” interpretations, we could talk about tone, rhythm, even mimicry, volume and vocal timbre in the proximity of the discourse on being. And especially about roles. A dramatic vision, a narratological analysis, a “setup” of the Aristotelian thought. Not for drama, not for the story, not for the stage, but for philosophy.

V LĂDUȚESCU GHEORGHE. *Aristotel vs. Platon.*

My lecture is devoted to the following thesis : the critique of the Platonism, as it appears in Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, A, 9, recovers Plato’s arguments from Parmenides 130A-133A, in order to constitute a propedeutics for the metaphysical reconstruction.

G REENSTINE JACOB. *On the Several Senses of Not-Being in Aristotle.*

For Aristotle there could never be a science of what is not, τὸ οὐκ ὄν or τὸ μὴ ὄν, because there is no object one might investigate. Yet we still may wonder about the concept and status of not-being in Aristotle’s philosophy. Indeed, since not-being was a contentious problem for his predecessors – Parmenides, Democritus, Gorgias, and Plato all discuss what is not – we would suspect that Aristotle also has something to say here.

Indeed, if we examine his intermittent discussions on this topic, we see that Aristotle has a coherent set of strategies for conceptualizing and utilizing not-being. For him there is not a single way of not-being, as there was in his predecessors’ philosophies. Instead, drawing from *Metaphysics* Δ.7 & Θ.10, we can distinguish three ways in which not-being is said to be. These are: (1) what is accidentally not something, the lack or **privation** of an attribute; (2) what is not insofar as it is **false**, the combination in thought or speech of things that are separate; (3) what is not insofar as it is only in potentially, the inactive or unactualized **potentiality** to be something. Without identifying these separate senses of not-being, we might be tempted, as were the atomists, to postulate a principle of not-being which is as fundamental as being itself (*Physics* I.3). Or we might run together the various senses of not-being into one concept, as with the Platonists’ assertion that falsity is the source of multiplicity (*Metaphysics* N.2).

There is no overarching principle of “What Is Not” for Aristotle: each of these distinct senses of not-being is subordinate to and dependent on οὐσία, for each must somehow be. Nevertheless, for Aristotle not-being is philosophically ineliminable: here lies on a concept of not-being addressing a number of problems. For instance, Aristotle discusses (1) **privation** when considering the principles of change in his *Physics* and *On Generation & Corruption*, (2) **falsity** when defending the principle of excluded middle in *Metaphysics* Γ.7, and (3) **potentiality** when arguing for reality of future contingencies in *de Interpretatione* 9. Aristotle cannot answer his predecessors’ questions without some articulation of the various

senses of not-being. Hence in this paper I elaborate each of these ways of not-being, showing how each is and yet somehow is not, and articulating how each differs from the others.

C IURLIONIS IONAS. *The Concept of Four Elements in Aristotelian Physics.*

In this presentation I am going to argue that the doctrine of four elements (fire, air, water and earth) is an essential idea on which Ancient Greek thinking is based on. Foundations of holistic Ancient Greek science are based upon the notion of four elements as well. The concept developed by Empedocles was vastly accepted throughout the Ancient Greek world. Plato and Aristotle are no exception. Both of them build their cosmology, meteorology, physics upon this idea. Aristotle, however, takes the concept onto next level. He disagrees and argues with Empedocles and Plato about the four elements. Therefore, Aristotle's contribution into the development of the concept in Ancient Greek science is rather more significant. Four elements are not only the key concept for Ancient Greek natural sciences grounding basic ideas in biology, chemistry, thermodynamics, theories of motion in physics and cosmology but it also forms a core structure for understanding human nature both physical and psychological. Moreover, the notion of four elements stretches far beyond the empirical realm and enters transcendental metaphysical realm where it is essential for understanding the order of Being itself. Again we have to recognize Aristotle's impact here through the connection of his physics to metaphysics. Therefore, four elements cannot be interpreted as being purely physical. This is well illustrated with their association with geometry and geometrical forms in writings of Plato and others. Thus transformation of the elements into each other must be understood also as a geometrical transformation of forms and cannot be simply reduced to different aggregation states. This idea leads to understanding the Ancient Greek mathematics in association with four elements and therefore not being separate from physics and metaphysics as parts of general world view. Geometry and arithmetic serve not only as instruments for calculation, or land measurement or in other words tools of τέχνη but also as foundation for metaphysics and ἐπιστήμη which is more important function of these sciences. At the same time it also applies to the basic metaphysical concepts of Sameness and Identity, Difference, Oneness. Aristotle's notion of four elements is based upon this dialectical background. Therefore, the concept of the four elements has to be interpreted dialectically and as such is one of the most important philosophical concepts for Aristotle and Ancient Greeks.

I FTODE CRISTIAN. *Aristotle's Approach to Metaphor: Cognitive, yet 'Non-cognitive'.*

Contemporary philosophy of language involves two opposing camps when it comes to the question of the "meaning" of metaphors: the *cognitive* approach (involving analytic philosophers like Black, Hesse, Lakoff, but also phenomenologists like Gadamer and Ricoeur) and the *non-cognitive* approach (Davidson, Davies, Rorty). A major objection to the non-cognitive view of metaphor is that it is a view that provides us with basically no criterion for distinguishing a metaphor from the act of putting two arbitrary nouns from a spoken language in a statement of the form 'A is B'. Also, the cognitive approach is usually traced back to Aristotle's remarks on the importance of metaphors for acquiring new knowledge and insight into the nature of things. My reading of Aristotle's approach to

metaphor will emphasize that it is necessary to place his remarks in a network of concepts that hold a major *ontological* grip: *metaphora*, *mimesis*, *physis*, *technê*, *logos*, etc. Understanding what Aristotle really meant by the 'imitation of nature' will enable us to regard the act of "grasping the resemblances" through metaphors as a major instance of this innate and most "natural" human "gift" of *mimesis*. And yet, it is not possible to avoid an inconsistency in Aristotle's account of the *heuristic* role of metaphors in cognition: the semantic dynamism involved by metaphors *kata to analogon* might actually prove to be a *transgression* of the "fixity" of (natural) genres and species. A significant problem arises when we try to explain the alleged superiority of metaphors to similes, stressed out in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. It seems clear that metaphors, for Aristotle, are cognitive not in the sense of conveying meanings, but of creating new ones. It follows, in a way that is not that distant to contemporary non-cognitive approaches, that understanding a metaphor is primary not about grasping meanings, but having a particular "experience" (Davies). A "live" metaphor *moves* us, elicits a kind of emotion, in a way that mere nonsense or usual expressions are not able to do it. Finally, the reading of a key passage from *Topics*, VI, 2, about "phrases" that are only resembling metaphors, but aren't based upon any kind of natural "likeness", makes us see that Aristotle's account doesn't actually help us with an *epistemological* procedure for the recognition of "true" metaphors. Like in the case of Plato's discussion of *mimesis*, we are left with an expression of the *metaphysical* necessity of separating "authentic" copies of nature from mere simulacra. I conclude that, following Aristotle, the "innate gift" of metaphorising is not equivalent to a "donation" of meaning in a phenomenological (Husserlian) sense, but that it only points to a chance, an occasion, a disposition for "seeing" things differently from the way we are used to, thus favouring semantic reconfiguration. I also hold that this *act* of metaphorising involves *emotion* in a way that modern cognitive approaches to metaphor tend to neglect.

RAMISHVILI VALERIAN. *Heidegger, Plato and Aristotle – A New Talk on Being.*

The necessity of dialogue is determined by the following circumstances: the modern man is staying before a new challenge, before a new epoch of unconcealment of Being. The common basis for dialogue is Parmenides. On the way *alethea* was revealed "being is and non-being isn't". We don't know that is primary being in itself and what is a primary form of "is" in itself. They agree with Parmenides: "*Sein ist*", but here is two "being". Therefore it is possible to put a question – what is the "Being" and how "is" the Being. Parmenides hasn't determined meaning the ontological status of "is". "Descartes claims to prepare a new and secure foundation for philosophy. But what he leaves undetermined in this "radical" beginning is the manner of being of the *res cogitans*, more precisely the meaning of being of the "sum". (BT, 23) Parmenides said: "it is" Here in "being is" isn't defined ontological meaning of "Being" and of "is". Concept of the Being became defective and narrow. We must accept a new and broadened concept of "ontological difference" not only as of the difference between Being (*Sein*) and entities (*Seienden*), but also as of the difference between Being and the forms of self-giveness of Being in the world. Heidegger carries out shifting from the conceptualization of Being to ontologization of Being, by creating the ontology of Being. Heidegger presented the forms of self-giveness of Being

and the forms of being the Being in the world as a hierarchical order: *Sein ist, Sein ereignis, Sein es gibt*. *Alethea* is a process and degree of self-giveness and openness of Being for Human.

D AŞDEMİR YUSUF. *Avicenna on the Two Barbaras: A new Reading of Modal Propositions in Terms of Subjects.*

Modal syllogism with necessary and absolute premises is one of the most controversial parts of Aristotle's modal syllogistics and has been intensely commented upon since Aristotle's time. It is because in the first mood of the first figure (*Barbara*), Aristotle accepts as valid syllogisms with necessary major and absolute minor premises (LX-L) while he rejects as invalid such syllogisms with absolute major and necessary minor premises (XL-L). This seemingly inconsistent account of Aristotle has been called the *Two Barbaras* problem and elicited, since Theophrastus, his immediate successor in the Lyceum, a voluminous literature of criticism and commentary. In this frame, this paper deals with the solution attempts for the *Two Barbaras* problem put forward by the most important Arabic logician of the Middle ages, Avicenna (İbn Sina, d. 1037). Avicenna, like his Greek predecessor Alexander of Aphrodisias, resorts to a modal interpretation of the so-called *dictum de omni* while tackling the problem, but what is new and original with him is that he introduces a new reading of modal propositions that bases upon descriptive interpretation of the subject term. According to this reading, the subject of a modal proposition is taken with the condition 'as long as it is described with the subject-term'. This paper aims at discussing Avicenna's descriptive reading of modal propositions and its advantages in the solution of the *Two Barbaras* problem with some references to the history of this reading and its correspondent or analogous in the medieval Western logic.

C ERNEA MIHAI. *What is a Biological Explanation? Between Aristotle and Darwin.*

The focus of this paper will revolve around the role of teleological explanations in biology. This type of explanatory effort seeks to account for a feature in a system by highlighting its role in one of processes, states or properties of that system. Before the evolutionary turn, the biological sciences used to be teleological to their core, but after Darwin's seminal "Origin of Species" the situation changed. Most Darwin scholars see Darwin as utterly repudiating teleology's role in biology – there is no overarching purpose that somehow guides evolution through natural selection.

This is at odds with traditional (in Darwin's time) biological explanations that trace their roots back to Aristotle's founding studies in "Parts of Animals" as well as his metaphysical views regarding the fixity of species and genera. Thus, Darwin seems to reject the basic Aristotelian principles that guided biological studies for hundreds of years. Recently, though, some scholars seem to suggest that there is common ground to be found between the founder of biology and the founder of evolutionary biology. Towards the end of his life Darwin was exposed to an English translation of Aristotle's "Parts of Animals" which led him to declare in one of his letters to the translator of the book: "Linnaeus and Cuvier have been my two gods, though in very different ways, but they were mere school-boys to old Aristotle." Moreover, by analyzing his correspondence, some authors argue today that Darwin never completely rejected teleology from biology, but tried to give it a scientific grounding.

The aim of my talk will be to explore this issues, comparing the teleological components (if any) of the two great authors' scientific exploration of the natural world and to see if there is more than simple civility and politeness to Darwin's views on Aristotle's contribution to the study of life.

A LBERGO GAETANO. *Comparative Anatomy and Semeiotic Inferences in the Historia Animalium.* The French zoologist Cuvier repeatedly underlined that the human mind naturally can be close to the truth from a causal inspection of the facts of nature or just becoming familiar with the relevant facts of the matter. This 'familiarity' with the animal kingdom is also the condition that underpins the *Historia Animalium*. The concept of *empeiria* has an essential role in scientific research. It is stated in the book I of *Metaphysics* and in *Posterior Analytics* (II,19). *The Historia* presents an idea of experience very similar to that of the *technai*, a sort of practical competence. It is quite far from the concept of experience as intended by the experimental method if with this term we intend a systematic observation guided by preexisting hypotheses, and that also follows a particular plan or involves a system that can be evaluated on the basis of accepted scientific standards. However, it is possible to trace two different attitudes adopted by Aristotle in the development of his major biological works. In the *Historia* he focuses on the *phainomena*, and his constant effort is centered on querying the observation data with an heuristic approach whose purpose is to control the conditions of observation.

Data can not be accepted in their immediate manifestness. So, his critical stance is motivated by his concern to determine the empirical conditions from which it is possible to test the validity of theories dealing with those phenomena. Quite another thing the *De Partibus*. Here the *phainomenon*, bound up with the epistemological framework of causes, asks to be theoretically justified, that is, theory has only to account for it. Obviously, an uncritical attitude towards the observation data may be a limit for the subsequent theorization, this could explain some erroneous explanations. But, in the *Historia* methodological suggestions are not lacking.

My aim is to demonstrate that the *Historia* has many resources in terms of practice of inferences.

The adoption of the comparative method in anatomy is consistent with a semeiotic way of reasoning.

For example, talking about the internal parts in humans, Aristotle says "They are for the most part unknown, at least those of man are, and hence we have to refer to those of other animals, the natural structure of whose parts those of man resemble, and examine them" (494b 22-24)¹⁴. To explore this aspect of the philosophy of science of Aristotle, in parallel with the most rigorous scientific structure present in the *Historia*, according to Lennox's recent contributions, is a way to show, as recognized by Randall, that Aristotle has not to be intended as a firm Baconian, because his main purpose is to find out why things are as they are.

I **VAN PETRIȘOR & FILIP ROSSI.** *Some Things Never Change: The Existential Fallacy and Definite Descriptions.*

The problem of the existential import of terms is one of the few problems of Aristotelian logic that engaged logicians and philosophers in the XXth century. The issue is well-known: some valid syllogistic sequents demand non-empty logical subjects for particular judgements. There is a reason why this problem in particular should have interested people after Frege's logic became well-known. There is a related problem in XXth century philosophy: the problem of the existential import of definite descriptions. The two have not been discussed together, but Strawson worked on both, and proposed the same solution for both. Propositions of the modern or the categorical kind are true or false only insofar as their terms or definite descriptions refer. Otherwise, they are absurd. It is remarkable that the same solution can fit both definite descriptions and terms.

In this paper, we attempt to show that this is possible because the two problems are structurally similar. We argue that the matter is semantical rather than syntactical, and that Strawson's solution is the only cogent and unitary one. Strawson was just one among many to propose solutions to the syllogistic side of the problem. But the other solutions are in various ways unsatisfactory. We trace the various deficiencies of these answers to a common cause: they sought interpretations of categorical judgements that would make them fit the given syntactic entailments. Prime examples of this approach can be found in Russell's and Łukasiewicz's works. Strawson's answer offers a solution that does not read predicate calculus into syllogisms, and his success is due to his focus on the semantics of existential import. The result of our paper is twofold. On the one hand, it supports Strawson's conclusions. On the other hand, and perhaps more importantly, it places a constraint on answers in the definite descriptions debate. Since the two debates are essentially about the same issue, the same answer ought to fit in both without further gerrymandering. Overall, our paper shows a new way in which Aristotelian logic can be relevant in modern debates. Some points of contention remain common between Ancient and contemporary philosophy; comparing views on such points has the potential to use the debates of old to illuminate those of today.

L **ATINOV EVGENI.** *Aristotle and Zeno's Paradoxes.*

The paper is concerned with the Aristotle's treatment of Zeno's paradoxes of Dichotomy and Achilles and the tortoise. His solution is compared with the contemporary, so called standard solution, which is widely accepted not only because of the way it resolves the paradoxes by itself but also because it agrees with the contemporary state of mathematics and physics. This connection with theories and ideas that were developed much later than Aristotle and now are widely accepted is an important part of the reason why the standard solution is regarded as the right solution nowadays. The aim of the paper is to show that also if we put aside the contemporary mathematical and physical views and try to look at Aristotle's solution on its own, we will see that it has counterintuitive consequences that make it unsatisfactory. This counterintuitive consequence is that geometrical objects (line segments, triangles, etc.) are changing in time similarly to physical objects.

A **TIM BEN CARLO & PENA JAY-PEE.** *Akratic Homosexuality.*

In this paper, we argue that there exists such form called “akratic homosexuality”. This form of homosexuality emerges based on the following premises: first, homosexuality as same-sex attraction phenomenon by which agents who commit and subject themselves to such activity find the sexual activity and the union epistemically unacceptable, yet, agents still commit it, therefore are considered slightly morally responsible; second, agents who commit acts that are deemed morally unacceptable and recognise that by choosing to do the act, despite the knowledge that doing so is wrong, but persist to commit the said act and by committing it, one’s admits it is caused by the weakness of the will is called akratic. Hence, persons who involve themselves in same-sex attraction and union but know it is wrong, yet, do it is an akratic homosexual. The paper utilizes Aristotle’s notion of akrasia and tries to relate this kind of psychological and epistemological state to homosexuality. Furthermore, we will show that Aristotle’s notion of akrasia has not yet been fully examined and applied to many diverse cases available to us today.

This paper is divided into three main sections. The first section will discuss the philosophical, cultural and social notions of homosexuality as concise as possible and its relevance to issues concerning morality and epistemology. The second section will present Aristotle’s notion of akrasia in his *Nicomachean Ethics*, its classical and contemporary interpretations, issues, and debates. The third section will discuss how akratic form of homosexuality emerges into being and what makes this form of homosexuality immune to moral but not epistemological judgment.

P **RUNĂ FLORIN.** *Can the Vicious be Friends?*

In this presentation I discuss the view on friendship held by Aristotle in books VIII and IX of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. The *Nicomachean Ethics* is the treaty in which Aristotle details most extensively his ethical principle of the *means*, a particularity that can be practiced to virtue only by a few. Being known the fact that the author gives friendship a special place in his work due to its political importance asserting that all social beings have a natural inclination towards it, it would be interesting to explore if he leaves open any theoretical possibility of exercising this activity for those who don’t have a high status of virtue.

The author categorizes friendship into three types: friendship of utility, friendship of pleasure and friendship of virtue which stands on one’s character. What interests us is to find out if friendships based on character can exist between those who are cowardice, those who show lack of spirit or between those who don’t practice the virtue of modesty, for example. My thesis is that shared flaws of character can also bring people together in an intimate way, in a way specific to true friendship. Aristotle states that similarity is one of the key aspects of friendship therefore why is it that shared vices can’t sustain real friendship.

Another way to tackle the puzzle comes from the famous paragraph – NE 1159a5-12 – where he states that friends can’t wish to one another the highest good since that will imply losing each other as friends. More succinctly friends can’t wish for one another to be gods, entities with perfect virtues – therefore the highest good, because friendship can no longer take place. The main reasons for this is that gods don’t *need* friends and that the gap of virtue between a human and a god is too big for friendship to arise. From this sketch of the

argument we can speculate that human virtue is imperfect *per se* leaving therefore open the possibility for true friendship to take place even between vicious people.

M IHAILOV Emilian & Vică Constantin. *Social Robots as Moral Companions. On Extending Aristotle's Conception of Friendship.*

Even though humanoid social robots are not fully developed, it is just a matter of time till highly complex human-robot interaction will become widespread within society. A humanoid social robot is an autonomous robot with similar to humans physical properties and appearance who is able to perform social tasks like having a dialogue, answering and asking questions, taking decisions, expressing emotions, or following social rules. We already have social bots or artificial companions, such as smartphone apps (eg. Siri), as well as social companions with limited functions (like Nao, Jibo or Pepper). Despite lacking consciousness, people see social robots as quasi-persons, thus being drawn to develop friendly relationships. This raises the question of how to conceptualize the companionships of social robots towards humans. For Aristotle the virtue of friendship is based on reciprocated goodwill, which each party is aware. Our objective is to assess the Aristotelian framework and extend it to the case of human-social robot relationship.

K ONCH MANIK. *Habit and Moral Character: An Analysis from Aristotle's Moral Philosophy.*

In this paper, I would like to investigate the relation between Aristotle's notion of habit and moral character and would try further to establish its contribution to moral psychology. According to Aristotle, the habit refers to an action which is practiced on a regular basis. It is through regular undertaking, an action is being personalized. As the habitual performance helps in the personification of action, it also would show us how the development of moral character takes place in the life of a person. There are two ways to understand the Aristotelian theoretical position. Some of the contemporary philosophers have argued that the Aristotelian moral philosophy is basically naturalistic and some of them are saying it is non naturalistic. In this connection, notion of moral virtue and development moral character can be discussed better with regard to the availability of empirical psychological evidence, rather than by other rule-centered moral theories, such as Kantian ethics. Thus, this study will discuss the Aristotelian virtue ethics by showing that it can explain the means of performing the moral behavior and development of moral character. This paper is divided into nine sections. In the first section, I have tried to explain the general meaning and definition of habit by various philosophers and psychologists. In the second and third section, an attempt has been made to analyse the formation and stages of cultivating habit to build a moral character. In the following section, the differences between habit and instinct are brought to this discussion in order to show that they could be integrated. The fifth and sixth sections are basically a critical reflection on the relationship between habit and moral character. Can we say that a bad habit is an indicative of bad moral character? If the answer to this question is in affirmative then it would imply that the scope of habits, particularly the notion of 'good habits' will be relative. This problem is elucidated in the final two sections.

BERESCHI ANDREI. *The Reception of Aristotelian Political Morphology in the works of Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas.*

The rediscovery of political morphology in the Middle Ages, the theory that deals with describing and classifying various forms of government, decisively happened because of the fundamental translation around 1260 of Aristotle's *Politics* made by William of Moerbeke. Consequently, significant commentaries to this work started to appear determining many variants of understanding Aristotle's Greek political categories. In addition to this, *Nicomachean Ethics* that was already exposing in a short manner (probably as *endoxa*) Aristotle's political morphology has been translated into Latin with approximately twenty years earlier by Robert Grosseteste. This situation affected an accurate reception of Aristotle's complete morphological system from his *Politics* because the commentators were constantly reading it in relation with the simplified system of *Nicomachean Ethics*.

Our paper presents the results of an investigation on the transmission of political forms within the political theory elaborated by Aristotle in *Nicomachean Ethics* and in the *Politics*. This is what we have called *political morphology*. The paper focuses on the problems encountered by Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas in their reception of Aristotle's theory of political regimes. On the one side there are linguistic difficulties originating in the translation from ancient Greek into Latin and on the other there are conceptual problems consisting in understanding the notion of each political form. Our analysis investigates the reception of Aristotle's political morphology mainly in the commentaries of Albert the Great and of Thomas Aquinas along with references to some other of their relevant treatises for our subject.

NICOLAE IOANA CRISTINA. *Potentiality and Actuality in C. G. Jung's Psychoanalysis.*

The aim of this research is to underline the influence that the Aristotelian concepts of potentiality and actuality have on Jung's psychoanalysis. For this purpose we will use as a study object the archetype of the shadow. We know from Aristotle that what is potential is prior to that which is actual, but also that the quality of potency does not necessarily imply the following of an actuality. Through the actualization of something that is potential A, as long as it is potential A, a change occurs. The *Metaphysics* highlights a distinction between potentialities that are innate and potentialities that are acquired by practice. To support our theory we will make use of the first type of potentiality.

Many centuries after Aristotle Jung will point out that the unconscious is a reality in potency, its contents being revealed through the affect. While the latter belongs to the personal unconscious, the archetype is the mark of the collective unconscious. It should be reminded here that, the greater the intensity of an affect, the greater its predilection for the pathological. As stated before, we will make use of the archetype of the shadow, its characteristics being fairly easy to outline due to its frequent and negative influence on the ego. The nature of this archetype can be inferred, in large measure, from the contents of the personal unconscious, the shadow being also a moral issue. We argue here that the archetypal shadow, the one belonging to the collective unconscious, is the shadow in its potentiality, the shadow as an archetype common to all individuals. To support this hypothesis we bring forward Jung's ideas according to which the content brought to light by an affect was always there, but also that the individual "...contains unconsciously, as an *a priori* datum, the entire psychic structure developed both upwards and downwards by his ancestors...".

⁴ When the shadow is repressed it can be unconsciously projected on other individuals, thus taking the form of pathological manifestations. Precisely through these manifestations the shadow is brought forth into actuality. We see here a transition from the archetypal shadow to the personal shadow, from the historical dimension of the archetype to the pathological, from a potentiality to an actuality.

PETRANCU ADELAIDA. *Potentiality, actuality and the genius.*

We all know Aristotle's metaphysics and the difference between actuality and potentiality as well. Therefore potentiality represents a state which the being has in itself and which may be brought to presence by switching it to actuality. This way, the wheat seed is an actuality and the wheat ear which will appear in different conditions is a potentiality. Being in potentiality or in actuality is specific to every being, and the transition from potentiality to actuality represents, in Aristotle's opinion, the explanation for the universal becoming, which is achieved by the effort of every being to transit from potentiality to actuality.

Based on these Aristotle's metaphysical considerations we will propose an approach from philosophy of culture, more precisely referring to philosophy and the subject of deal with the devil from literature. The first record of this theme was reported in Medieval Germanic legends, which it would coincide with the beginning of cult literature in Western Europe and it was resumed through the history of literature until the 20th century. Although the belletristic writings on the deal with the devil present different approaches, they have a common element: all literary characters which made this kind of deal did it because they were unhappy with their current condition, which was a limited one, in order to gain something more – absolute knowledge, love or extraordinary artistic creations, if we would list only some objectives – in order to bring them closer to perfection. All these characters are humans in actuality and in potentiality they are geniuses and this potentiality can not be brought in actuality only through the deal with the devil, these extraordinary metaphor, which shows exactly the genius condition, which wants to reach perfection with the price of his own life or with the price of his own immortal soul which it will give immortality to his creations through their value which will transcend the time.

On the other hand, if we focus on the Aristotle's final cause then people who make a deal with the devil want to achieve their own perfection which will contribute to the universal perfection.

To conclude, Aristotle's difference between potentiality and actuality can be encountered indirectly in literary writings on the deal with the devil too which it proves its perennality and actuality.

GELAN VICTOR. *On hapinnes and contemplation in Aristotle.*

In this paper I aim to show that happiness in Aristotle should not be understood in a restrictive manner as the actualization of one virtue, even if this virtue could be considered the most important among all other virtues. Happiness should not be equated in an exclusive manner with the activity of contemplation. The context in which the problem I approach here ranges within the domain of searching for the good of man which is nothing but happiness. In book one of

⁴ C.G. Jung, *Complete Works 9/1 – The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious*, 2nd edition, trans. R.F.C. Hull, (Princeton University Press, 1968), 279-80.

Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle states that there are three modes of life which should be considered and analyzed when it comes about the happiness of man. These are the following: the mode dedicated to pleasures, the one based in public affairs and the mode of contemplation (1095b, 18-19).

After analyzing each of these modes of life, according to some commentators Aristotle will conclude in book X of *Nicomachean Ethics* that the happiest life is nothing but life dedicated to contemplation. But how and in what sense should we understand this conclusion by Aristotle which seems to run against some of his statements from book I of *Nicomachean Ethics*? I shall try to argue that there is no actual contradiction between the two positions of Aristotle if indeed happiness is understood in an inclusivist and hierarchical sense that is as the actualization of all virtues (both ethic and dianoetic virtues) with accent put on that virtue, e.g. contemplation which tends to lead man to the likeness to the divine in the highest degree.

G ALIȚĂ CRINA. *Aristotelian logic and Arabic logicians. A means of Aristotle's reception in the Arabic classical logic.*

For the East, as well as for the West, Aristotle represented a pole of thinking of considerable importance for the development of the forthcoming systems. The objective of the present communication is to establish a thematic structure of the reception of Aristotle's logic, reflected in the Arabic logic corpuses of some of the most important Arabic canonical logicians, namely Al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, al-Kindī, Ibn Rušd and Ibn al-Muqaffa', thinkers whose veridicity of the logical opuscles has already been attested, and where Aristotle's influence in their thinking has already been certified – which will facilitate our method of understanding the different typologies of reception, of proving whether there really existed a typology of topics of considered subjects on logic, and of especially understanding what the motivation behind such a choice was. Pursuing the research principle, we will firstly explain the source of Arabic logic and its thematic directions, and we will, through this perspective, become aware of the role that Aristotle played in this framework. Furthermore, a classification of Arabic translations of the opuscles that concern Aristotle's logic and the socio-cultural implications of the transfer of his logical thinking, will be examined. We will secondly take into account the main discourses that concern Aristotle's image in the creation of the Arabic logic, and we will especially consider the argumentation of his role in the framework of opuscles, whose analysis is being proposed. Finally, our aim is to make an analysis of the texts of the Arabic logicians in comparison with the Aristotelian logical texts. We will thus consider their content and thematic structure, and we will then attempt to reveal the answers to the following questions: How is the presence or absence of certain typologies of subjects being explained by the Arabic logicians themselves and what is their argument behind each theoretic framework either accepted or rejected? Are there any cultural implications of Aristotle's reception within Arabic logic? How was the importance of Aristotle and especially the importance of his logical theory reflected in the Arabic philosophical conscience and how did the Arabic logic assimilate his principles, so as to set the framework for some new areas of scientific reference? We will thus show the manner in which the textual perception of the *Organon* was conceived by the above-mentioned Arabic logicians.

Saturday, 26 November

M IHĂILĂ ALEXANDRU. *How Aristotelian was the exegetical school of Antioch?*
The paper discusses Aristotle's influence on the exegetical School of Antioch and on its representatives, Diodore of Tarsus, Theodore of Mopsuestia, Theodoret of Cyrus and John Chrysostom. The exegetical method is presented, compared with that used in Alexandria and it will be argue how proper it might be to talk about an Aristotelian Antiochene school opposed to the Platonic Alexandrian one. Starting with Nash's classical study and up till modern authors which argue for an influence (Maas, Wallace-Hadrill) or against it (Becker, R. Hill), the paper evaluates the arguments and tries to draw a conclusion.

B ERECHET ȘTEFAN IONESCU. *Aristotle within the Byzantine Iconoclastic Dispute.*
P.J. Alexander, famous American historian of German origin, defined the second phase of the iconoclastic dispute in Byzantium (813-843) as "the scholastic period of the iconophilous theory". It is the time when Aristotle, already part of the Byzantine intellectual milieu, makes his entrance within the theology of the icon. The two great iconodule theologians and saints of the IXth century, Patriarch Nikephoros of Constantinople and Theodore the Studite, used a lot of elements of Aristotle's logic to define certain key concepts of the iconophilous teaching. They rejected the iconoclastic concept of *icon consubstantial with the prototype*, opposing it the notion of icon in *relation* with the prototype, notion drawn from Aristotle's category of *relatives*, articulated around two key-terms – formal resemblance and homonymy – and enriched with the specifically orthodox idea of the spiritual presence of the prototype within the icon. Moreover, Patriarch Nikephoros dwells also on the causal relation between the archetype and the icon, based on the four types of causes established by Aristotle in his *Metaphysics*, adding two more, the instrumental and the exemplary.

The well-known Aristotelic distinction between form and matter constitutes the basis of the argumentation on the ontologic distinction between icon and prototype, the icon „made by hand” being defined starting from three main aspects: form of the prototype, material underlayer and form-matter whole. The form is seen as an *accident*, in the Aristotelic meaning of the term, enriched with the distinction operated by St. John of Damascus between separable and inseparable accidents. The homonymy between icon and prototype is understood by St. Theodore the Studite from their causal relation, also defined based on Aristotle's category of relatives. The same Aristotle helps sustaining the equivalence between Icon and Scripture (equivalence sight-hearing), focusing on the importance of the first mentioned (as seeing is considered the first among the five senses). The fundamental distinction between *circumscription* and *inscription*, which permitted the dismantling of the terrible iconoclastic christologic aporia, is operated by Patriarch Nikephoros starting from Aristotle's distinction between *definition* and *description*. In his turn, St. Theodore the Studite uses another of Aristotle's distinction, that between *universal* and *individual*, in order to reject the iconoclastic thesis that denied the concrete individual nature of the Hypostasis of Christ and His iconic representability.

The present study proposes to show all these tools that Aristotle offered those who defended the icon in the IXth century through his Neoplatonist commentators and the *Dialectics* of St. John of Damascus, defenders who tried to confer a solid logical basis to the iconophilous doctrine.

C ARABĂ ADRIAN. *Rejection of Aristotle's criticism to Plato's theory of ideas in "De Differentiis" by Georgios Gemistos Plethon.*

In Western philosophy, the 15th century is hallmarked by the rediscovery of Plato as much as by deepening criticism of Aristotle. There have been certain reservations about the Stagiritos even during the previous centuries. Those who thought that "Plato was glorified by the princes and the nobles, while Aristotle was praised by the masses; it was our great men who treasured Plato, but the mob valued Aristotle" (Petrarca) were growing in number.

However, Aristotle's authority remained unshaken as Plato was "rather loved than known" (E Garin) despite the fact that, in the first part of the 15th century, due to translators such as Leonardo Bruno or Umberto and Candido Decembrio, the number of "dialogues" made available in Latin had grown.

But the true rediscovery of Plato by the Western world is paradoxically beginning with the unionist council from Ferrara-Florence (1437/38) along with the private speeches given by the Byzantine philosopher Georgios Gemistos Plethon to members of the elite of the two cities. One of the most illustrious men in the audience – Cosimo de Medici, was so impressed that he decided to establish, at a later time, in Florence, an academy for the ancient Athenian philosopher.

Along with the love for Plato, the Byzantine brought the odium for Aristotle as well. His opusculum "About the things that differentiate Aristotle from Plato" which he wrote during his Italian period, did not actually focus on the distinction in doctrine that would set Plato and Aristotle apart, as the title might suggest. It is in fact, a condemnation of Aristotle, regarded as his Master's ungrateful disciple, a traitor, hardly qualified especially in metaphysics, his speech obscure and entangled, an inconsistent liar, rejected therefore, by the Church.

If some of his contemporaries were still in doubt, Plethon was deeply convinced that Aristotle's philosophical system was a true heresy. Could there be a greater heresy than debating Plato's theory of ideas by his very disciple? But beyond the philosophical arguments developed by Plethon, his text is uncovering a greater theological issue, as Georgios Genadios Scholarios, Plethon's most important opponent has intuited: and that was the onslaught against Christian theology, be it Eastern or Western related, which was relying quite as lot on Aristotle's philosophical thinking.

It was the Christianity itself that was at issue and Plethon was later denounced as an objector against the faith. Defending a theory that had already been condemned "expressis verbis" by the Church ("anathema be on those who [...] would accept Plato's ideas as the truth" as a 11th century synod (1082) decreed) was truly a gutsy endeavor during those times.

VILD MARIAN. *"The wisdom of men" and "The mysterious wisdom of God": Aristotle and St. Paul.*

A function and ontological need of the human being, knowledge is an extremely broad concept, philosophers identifying different types. Their synthesis could be summarized in another concept reuniting discursive knowledge with intuitive knowledge but also with experimental knowledge, commonly designated as "wisdom". The biblical revelation however also brings to light another type of wisdom which has its basis in a requirement that enriches the concept of knowledge. This is "the wisdom of God", which it is accessible only to the "spiritual man". In what follows I will investigate both the commonalities and the differences between these two types of knowledge and wisdom on the basis of the writings of Aristotle and St. Paul.

CIĂȘCAI GHEORGHE. *Aristotelian Influences in Leibniz's Logics.*

The main aim of this article is to highlight the impact of some ideas of Aristotle's metaphysics and logic, ideas shared by Leibniz, in the project of the philosopher from Hanover to reform the traditional logic. Thus, the research will try to support the hypothesis that excessive respect of Leibniz for the Aristotelian tradition, to restore substantial forms, to treat relationships between terms and not the relationships between sentences etc. affected the project of the logic's renewal.

HIZIR SAIME. *Essence and Existence in Aristotle and Avicenna: Identification or Separation.*

The primary work of Aristotle where he studies being qua being is *Metaphysics*. Book of Zeta is especially important to understand the idea of Aristotle on substance. In Zeta 6, Aristotle identifies essence and existence by saying that "...each thing is thought to be not different from its substance, and the essence is said to be the substance of each thing" (1031a15). It seems by identifying essence with the individual substance; Aristotle posited essence as a substance. But what he means by essence is not clear here. Is it signifies the unity of matter and form or solely the form? Although it seems as if Aristotle considers essence signifying the unity of form and matter in Z 4 and 6, in Z7, Z 17 and H 2-4, he says essence is the form of a thing. But whether he means by essence solely the form or the unity of form and matter one thing is clear in Z 6: identification of essence and existence.

One of the great commentators of Aristotle in middle ages was Avicenna. Unlike Aristotle, in his *Metaphysics* (el-Ilahiyyat), Avicenna claims that essence and existence could be considered independently from each other. Avicenna thinks essence as an expression of the unity of a substance and he regards it within the context of contingency (imkan). Existence, on the other hand, is understood in relation with the necessity (vücub). In fact, the separation of essence and existence comes from his idea of causes. Accordingly material and formal causes are understood in relation with essence, efficient and final causes are in relation with the Intelligent Agent or with God as an ultimate basis of existence. In this paper, I will try to explain why on the one hand identification of essence and existence is the main feature of Aristotle's metaphysics and why on the other hand the separation of them plays a vital role in Avicenna's philosophy. Why do they reach to different conclusions about essence and existence although both consider substance in a hylomorphic context? What are

the motives behind their ideas? Is there any advantage of the idea of Avicenna on essence and existence over Aristotle?

C HIȚOIU DAN. *Gregory Palamas' use of Aristotle.*

The following presentation has two basic aims: a.) to critically reconstruct the concept of experience in the works of Walter Benjamin; b.) to apply the concept following the fate of some historical actors on the modern city's scene like the flaneur or the rag-picker.

The first aim is to be reached by showing how Benjamin understands experience by having three main aspects: a.) epistemological (seizing the object from the perspective of its historical origin); b.) theological (saving the lost possibilities of the object by saving the memory of its lost origin); c.) political (the critique of the ideological and social mechanisms that endanger this particular form of memory). Judaic mesianism and Kabbalistic language theory meet in drawing the main lines of Benjamin's meaning of his "theological interpretation" of history.

The way Benjamin then speaks about secondary figures of the modern city-world like the flaneur, the rag-picker or the child gives a very colorful physiognomy of the scenario described above and a valuable historical concreteness.

B ARNA ATANASE. *Aristotelian ἔξις vs. patristic ἔξις.*

Interpretation models of ἔξις in patristic contexts and their final purpose: the theological discourse about divinization. In this study I propose a parallel between the main significance that Aristotle gives in *Categoriae* 8 (8b27-9a13) for ἔξις, and the way Fathers of the Church (mainly Saints Maximus Confessor, John of Damascus and Gregory Palamas) have explained the concept of θέωσις, using ἔξις as an important correlative concept.

As for Aristotle, ἔξις (permanent *habitus*) is a central concept regarding the category of 'quality', analyzed together with διάθεσις (temporary *habitus* or natural *possession*), for the Fathers of the Church, ἔξις had a strong role in defining the acquaintances of spiritual life and experiences. Part of an indirect, but strong, Aristotelian reception, Saint Maximus Confessor uses ἔξις very often, but in a general perspective, mainly in an ethical or spiritual sense (*Questiones ad Thalassium* III, 37 etc.). For Maximus' doctrine of θέωσις, we can speak of a real "divinization of human ἔξις" (cf. A. Lévy, 2006), understood as a way to explore and resolve the philosophical and conceptual tension of the relationship between God and human, uncreated and created, together within the doctrine of θέωσις.

I continue showing that, beginning with Saint John of Damascus (*Dialectica* 52, 59 etc.), ἔξις becomes an important part of the logical construction of the theological exposition of faith, as a logical procession of the Aristotelian categories, mainly in an ontological and logic perspective. As Saint John reconstructs the 'categories', based on the ὑπόστασις – οὐσία frame, ἔξις becomes a very good theological *topos* for describing the specificity of real θέωσις, strongly linked with an theological and spiritual rich patristic vocabulary of divinization.

Meanwhile, for Saint Gregory Palamas, ἔξις is already a concept that receives a special and well determined character (*Hagioriticos Tomos*, ed. Hristou, II, p. 570, 17 etc.), as part of his general refutation of created energies in the Latin Augustinian and scholastic

influenced theology of $\theta\acute{\epsilon}\omega\sigma\iota\varsigma$, as it was exposed by Varlaam of Calabria. The uncreated energies of God, which unite and divinize the soul are not $\xi\acute{\xi}\epsilon\iota\varsigma$, as the distinction between human habitus and the uncreated energies of God makes more evident that $\theta\acute{\epsilon}\omega\sigma\iota\varsigma$ is a divine 'gift', more than a human achievement.

$\epsilon\acute{\xi}\iota\varsigma$ is a part of a constant process of divinization from a pure Aristotelian logical legacy, to a later well crystalized theology of union of man with God.

S TOENESCU CONSTANTIN. *The Aristotelean essential explanation and its challenges.* Aristotle, in his *Posterior Analytics*, made a distinction between knowledge of the fact (knowledge that p is so) and knowledge of the reasoned fact (knowledge why p is so). He offered two arguments, the first which provide us only with knowledge of the fact, the second which provide us with knowledge of the reasoned fact.

Here are the two arguments:

- (E) (1) the planets do not twinkle
 - (2) all objects that do not twinkle are near the earth
 - (3) therefore, the planets are near the earth.
- (F) (1) the planets are near the earth
 - (2) all objects that are near the earth do not twinkle
 - (3) therefore, the planets do not twinkle.

The two arguments fit the requests of covering laws model proposed by Hempel, but only one of them is intuitively accepted. We agree that nearness is the cause of not twinkling and that the nearness of the planets to the earth explains why they do not twinkle, and not vice-versa, that not twinkling explains why they are near to the earth.

Aristotle also offered an explanation in terms of his distinction between knowledge of fact and knowledge of reasoned fact:

"... of two reciprocally predictable terms the one which is not the cause may quite easily be the better known and so become the middle term of the demonstration... This syllogism, then, proves not the reasoned fact but only the fact; since they are not near because they do not twinkle. The major and middle of the proof, however, may be reversed, and then the demonstration will be of the reasoned fact... since its middle term is the proximate cause." (*Posterior Analytics*, 78a 28 – 78b 3).

Aristotle developed these ideas and admit a special type of explanation:

"Demonstrative knowledge must rest on necessary basic truths; for the object of scientific knowledge cannot be other than it is. Now attributes attaching essentially to their subjects attach necessarily to them... It follows from this that premises of the demonstrative syllogism must be connections essential in the sense explained: for all attributes must inhere essentially or else be accidental, and accidental attributes are not necessary to their subjects." (*Posterior Analytics*, 74b 5-12)

B.A. Brody used Aristotle's approach and tried to offer an alternative to the covering laws model of explanation. He developed the so-called essential explanation and proposed some answers to possible questions raised from other philosophical perspectives like Duhem's holistic theory and Popper's methodological approach.

I try to offer in this paper a reconstruction of this debate and to find the weaker points of the so-called essential explanation.

§ **TEFANOV GHEORGHE.** *Aristotle and the Dependence of Rational Action on Knowledge.* In *Meno*, 98b, Plato claims that "true opinion leading the way renders the effect of each action as good as knowledge does". By contrast, Aristotle seems to support the idea that reasonable action depends not only on true beliefs, but on knowledge, since "we are moved to act" by "deliberate preference" (*Nicomachean Ethics*, 1139a, 30-35), which is guided by *phronesis* (*NE*, 1139b, 1, 15), which, in its turn, is "a true habit, joined with reason" (*NE*, 1140b, 20). If we assume that the traditional definition of knowledge given by Plato (see *Meno* 98a2, *Phaedo* 76b5-6, *Phaedo* 97d-99d2, *Symposium* 202a5-9, *Republic* 534b3-7, *Theaetetus* 201d, *Timaeus* 51e5) applies in this context, then it follows that in order to perform a rational action A with the intention to achieve the practical end E, according to Aristotle, one must have a true belief, joined with reason (i. e., to know) that by doing A one can achieve E. This seems enough to motivate an attempt to see what we could learn from Aristotle in the context of the contemporary Action-Knowledge Principle debate.

In fact, the debate in case is focused on the following two principles:

(The Action-Knowledge Principle) Treat the proposition that *p* as a reason for acting only if you know that *p*. (Hawthorne & Stanley 2008: 578)

(The Reason-Knowledge Principle) Where one's choice is *p*-dependent, it is appropriate to treat the proposition that *p* as a reason for acting iff you know that *p*. (Hawthorne & Stanley 2008: 578)

Critical reactions to either one of the two principles, or to both, have been expressed in the more recent literature (see, for instance, Neta 2009, Gerken 2011, Fantl and McGrath 2012, Smithies 2012, Gao 2016), so one might reasonably hope that perhaps a more fine grained approach to the matter (as the one provided by the Aristotelian distinctions between *technê*, *epistêmê* and *phronêsis*) would provide better results. I aim to explore this possibility in my conference.

P **ARTENIE CĂTĂLIN.** *Truth and Opinion on Aristotle.*

My paper will examine the Aristotelian notion of *endoxon*. Quite often, in his inquiries about physics, ethics, and politics, Aristotle starts from a number of views that he calls *endoxa*. A view is *endoxon* if it is believed either by (i) everyone or (ii) the majority or (iii) the wise (all the wise or some of them). The fact that the majority or the wise believe these views is for Aristotle an *evidence* that they are true. He then clarifies them, attempts to make them consistent, and in the end comes up with his own solutions. So what are these views, which he calls *endoxa*? Cicero (and many others after him) used the Latin

word *probabile* for *endoxon*. But that would be misleading, to claim that Aristotle philosophy is (often) grounded on probabilities. In the Oxford Translation of Aristotle (in 12 volumes, edited by Smith and Ross) *endoxon* has been translated (in many occurrences) by ‘common opinion’ (that was the time when Oxford philosophy was under the influence of Ryle and Austin). This, too, would be misleading, because in a number of instances a view is *endoxon* if it is held by just one philosopher. In the Revised Oxford Translation (in two volumes, edited by Jonathan Barnes), *endoxon* has been consistently rendered as ‘reputable’. Barnes has argued in an article (published in 1980) that the views Aristotle starts from are views of ‘good reputation’ among the majority or the wise. This, however, is very puzzling: why would Aristotle start his inquiries from the opinions of good reputation held by ordinary men or the wise? Do not opinions change from one age to another? And why would he be interested in the opinions of the many? Myles Burnyeat has argued that Aristotle ‘propounds a cyclical theory of history, according to which each viable social arrangement, each art and each science is rediscovered innumerable times after periodic cataclysms.’ In other words, according to Aristotle ‘the same opinions recur, not once or twice, but infinitely often.’

The starting point of my paper will be Burnyeat’s (reputed) interpretation of *endoxon*.

D RAGOMIR ALEXANDRU. *Is Kripke’s semantics for Quantified Modal Logic committed to Aristotelian essentialism?*

I will begin by offering a presentation of a Kripkean semantics for Quantified Modal Logic, and afterwards, I will attempt at tracking possible sources of commitment to essentialism. Such a commitment may stem either from the very construction of a model for Quantified Modal Logic, or from different propositions that such models validate. I will discuss whether these commitments can be identified with Aristotelian essentialism.

G HINEA DIANA. *Aristotle and Kant on the Knowledge of Nature.*

In my paper I will discuss the manner in which Kant’s *Table of Categories*, inspired by Aristotle’s metaphysical reflections, open the discussion on the limits and possibilities of the knowledge of nature. Therefore, I will examine the relationship between the Aristotelian thought and Kant’s philosophy in order to reshape and define concept of nature, the role of reason to structure the nature, as well as the laws of nature, all these three elements providing a certain acceptance on the knowledge of nature.

A HMED SABEEN. *The Genesis of Secular Politics in Medieval Political Thinking: The King of Averroes and the Emperor of Dante.*

Political philosophy is a discipline that finds its roots in the writings of Plato and Aristotle, and the genealogy of political theory may be analyzed as contextually-sensitive variations on these originary writings. Although the Western philosophical canon – particularly that which is disseminated in university seminar rooms – highlights the texts of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau as the foundations of Western secularism, the seeds of secular thought take root in the writings of Medieval Aristotelian Muslim and Christian philosophers. This paper analyzes precisely this era of overlooked

political philosophy and illustrates the nuanced transition to secular political thought in the intellectual exchange between Muslim and Christian thinkers. In order to more closely examine this philosophical exchange within the context of the political, it focuses principally on Iberian philosopher and jurist, Ibn Rushd (Averroes, Latinized,) and Italian poet and statesman, Dante Alighieri. By examining Averroes' writings in the *Decisive Treatise* in juxtaposition with Dante's *De Monarchia*, the similarities of the political authority – Aristotelian at its core – that each philosopher postulates will be brought into sharp relief. It would be erroneous to directly attribute the development of Dante's political philosophy to that of Averroes' original works; however, Dante was undoubtedly indebted to Averroes' famed Commentaries on Aristotle. Indeed, Averroes – a known Muslim – assumes a privileged spot in Purgatory in Dante's *Divine Comedy*, standing alongside such great thinkers as Socrates and Aristotle themselves. Regarding his work, it is Averroes' Commentaries on Aristotle's writings that most certainly influenced Dante's philosophy and theorizations of the divine and the secular. Using Aristotle – the "Father of Political Science" – as the foundation of their respective theories alongside critical hermeneutics of their respective Scriptures, both Averroes and Dante introduced notions of the state that were, in distinct yet significant ways, heralds of what would later develop into the secularization of the political. Ultimately, this paper aims to illuminate the Medieval, Aristotelian writings of the Muslim philosophers and their Christian successors as essential works in the development of Western secularism.

SERBAN OANA. *The Puzzle of Aristotelian Elements in Foucault's Critique on the History of the Desiring Man and the Aesthetics of Existence.*

Foucault's lecture on Aristotle in the volume *The History of Sexuality*, is occasioned by the project that the French philosopher develops in the terms of "ethical subjectivation". The main risk of accommodating his individual line of research and its possible correspondences with Aristotle's moral philosophy is that of revisiting the latter as an adept of the ethical subjectivation, a hypothesis which is, in itself, unsustainable, given the fact that the two thinkers apply contrasting conceptual and methodological approaches of morality. Even though there are some compatibilities between the Foucauldian significances given to the virtue, to the moral codes and to the individual's character and discipline, and the originating acceptances of these notions from Aristotle's ethics, that would be largely explained in my research, I will argue that the only sustainable intersection of these two radically different moral traditions is reflected by the so-called "history of the Desiring Man" (Foucault 1985:6). I understand by this concept a homogeneous succession of Hellenistic and Christian models of spiritual conversion, self-constitution and self-government. My current paper represents the continuity of a former research from 2016 ("Aristotle and Foucault on the History of the Desiring Man. The Risks of Reading Aristotle as an Adept of Ethical Subjectivation", presented during the *World Congress Aristotle 2400 Years* in Thessaloniki). In my initial article, I argued that that Aristotle would never have been an adept of the ethical subjectivation, in Foucault's terms, by examining and proving that none of the four modes of subjectivation to which the French philosopher refers – *the ethical substance, the types of subjection, the forms of elaboration of the self, and the moral teleology* (32) – has any conceptual grounds in the Stagirit's ethics, either because their integration would cause contradictions or tensions within this paradigm, either because their related explanations are inconsistent

with the main objectives of Aristotle's ethics. I will continue the working-hypothesis and conclusions derived from this thesis, in my current paper, with the purpose of composing what I call "the puzzle of Aristotelian elements in Foucault's critique on the history of the Desiring Man", as a set of concepts, problems and potential solutions that reshape the strikes of the *aesthetics of existence* from Antiquity to Modernity.

MORARU CORNEL. *Mimesis and physis in Aristotle's thinking. Human's mimetic nature.*
The double account on human nature as discursive and social being (*zoon logon echon* and *zoon politikon*), both occurring in Aristotle's *Politics*, is one of the most talked about common places in the history of philosophy. The link between human's sociality and rationality became so strong over the ages that, eventually, merged the two Aristotelian definitions into one main paradigm of understanding man's most essential traits. But, in this way, the original philosophical thought got displaced from its own context and falsified.

I will argue that the original Aristotelian thought cannot be understood properly without also taking into consideration, along with the two features already mentioned, a third one, which occurs in Aristotle's treatise on art – the *Poetics*. There, the Greek philosopher states that a *mimetic impulse* is common to all man and that the ability to imitate others is also given by nature. *Mimesis* is, thus, a *symphyton*, and is viewed as the most important essential human trait because, without the power to imitate others, the human being can develop neither rationality, nor sociability. So, *mimesis* is viewed as the most basic, constitutional, character of human's *psyche*. If the soul is the human being's principle of motion, then this is only because it has a tendency towards *imitation* or, in other words, the soul is dynamic just because the *mimesis* as a *symphyton* sets it in motion.

If this is correct, then *mimesis* is both the principle of art and the principle of human rationality. In other words, art is the fundamental human behavior, which opens the possibility of human sociability. This more profound definition of the essence of the human being can be also linked with the human *ethos*, which is viewed as a learnable "second human nature", which is not given at birth, but acquired throughout the entire lifespan. In this way, we can link Aristotelian philosophy of art, ethics, metaphysics and logic by following the line of *mimesis*.

My opinion is that this systematic interpretation of the Aristotelian thinking can shine a new light on the place of the *Poetics* in the configuration of Aristotle's works and make the philosophy of art one of the main places of interest for modern interpreters.

ANCEA RALUCA. *From Aristotle's Scala Naturae to Post human aesthetics.*⁵
In a time when thinkers are preoccupied with the dissolution of any social, racial or naturalist hierarchy, Aristotle's *Scala naturae*, together with the Cartesian "I think therefore I am", remain symbols of the anthropocentric view of the world. Among different methods to surpass this substantial, anthropocentric view, Derrida thus proposes an alternative to Cartesian slogan: "The animal looks at us and we are naked before it. And *thinking*

⁵ This paper is supported by the CNCS PROJECT D PLATFORM PNII-RU-TE-2014-4-2601.

perhaps begins there." At the same time, the newest experiments in biology and ethology regarding the way in which nonhuman persons (dolphins, chimpanzees, elephants) display intelligence, understanding, emotion and even a certain kind of sense of the beautiful, seem to also make the rungs on Aristotle's Ladder of Nature open to movement and interpretation. A couple of questions stand out here: why should the nonhuman persons come a couple steps below humans, how do we know that thinking is so different from sniffing or scenting and why is this zone of sensibility so neglected or reduced to a secondary position in philosophy and the arts?

In this context, in the field of aesthetics we are facing a significant series of challenges. New hybrid domains such as artistic nano- and genetic technologies or geo-philosophy (Deleuze) spring out. A new series of artistic projects, that take into consideration the shift from the trivial representation of the animal to the real animal interaction and concern, emerge from this urge to reconsider the otherness, the non-human. Animals are engaged by artists such as Olly and Suzi, Mark Dion, Paula Rego, Perdita Philips and Sue Coe in the making processes of the artworks. Seem that Aristotle's Ladder of Nature is due to have a couple of rungs replaced.

A new less anthropocentric view is therefore needed together with a thorough reconsideration of nature as nature in itself, and with an acknowledgement of an independent animal phenomenology and animal *Umwelt* (typical *environment-world*). Thus, one should also notice the inevitable turn to post-human aesthetics: a field of knowledge that no longer follows the modern decree that everything is to be understood in relation with the human and enables us to reflect and ask questions about identity, creativity and post-humanism.

P OP MIHAELA. *Actuality of Aristotelian aesthetic concepts in contemporary philosophical thought – A case study: performance art.*

Our purpose is to prove that Aristotelian concepts are still actual, being deeply reevaluated by 20th-century philosophical thought. We focused on two representative philosophers of this epoch: Gianni Vattimo, as an interpreter of Aristotle's concepts, and A.N. Whitehead, for his process philosophy in which he admires Aristotle's *genesis* theory and implements it in his new vision of the universe as a continuous process. We will apply these theories to a contemporary art known as *performance art*, *body art* or *action*.

We will especially use the following Aristotelian concepts: *mimesis* and *poiesis* (*poiein*). These concepts, used in aesthetics, have suffered significant change in their meanings due to the dramatic artistic revolution in the early 20th century, usually called the Avant-garde movement, which completely changed the way of artistically thinking and creating afterward. Our question would be if we can still speak about *mimesis* and *poiein* in performance art, which is an art of *action*, not of a finished artistic product.

Vattimo demonstrates that *techné* (defined as art) supposes *genesis* (creativity) as process of *poiein* (production of the work of art) but the active principle is not in the produced object; it is in the producer himself – the author of a *para physin* creative process as it is in accordance with nature but initiated from the outside of the process itself. On the other hand, performance art implies an action not an artistic finished material product. The spectator participates in the creation of a work of art but which is not material as in the

classical tradition. On the contrary, it is an on-going process. Alfred Whitehead's philosophy of process revisits Aristotle's theory of movement (*kinesis*), reevaluating the concept of *genesis* even if he considers the concept of *substance* as already obsolete from the point of view of the contemporary philosophical thought. In our opinion, Whitehead's philosophy, especially concepts such as *actual entity*, *concrecence*, *transition*, *extensive continuum*, *body withness* and *symbolic reference*, are fundamental notions when trying to understand the performance art.

We will refer to such several actions produced by John Cage and Marina Abramović together with her partner, Ulay.

M INCĂ BOGDAN. *Heidegger's Interpretation of the Aristotelian Poiesis and of Its Importance for the Preeminence of Sophia Over Phronesis.*

All of Heidegger's interpretations of Aristotle between 1921 and 1927 (the publishing year of *Being and Time*) are based on the following assumption: the Greek meaning of Being, to which Aristotle constantly (albeit implicitly) refers in his metaphysical investigations, was Being-produced, *Hergestelltsein*, i.e. Being-brought-to-the-fore and thus Being-present, *Gegenwärtigsein*. **The act of producing something (*poiesis*)** is the paradigm which enabled Aristotle to develop his analysis of movement (*kinesis*) in his *Physics* and thus to obtain his celebrated concepts of *dynamis*, *energeia*, *entelecheia*, by which the first understanding of "nature" (*physis*) was made possible in the West. The Aristotelian achievement was so groundbreaking, that this implicit meaning of Being as produced-ness (resulting in constant presence) was to dominate the whole history of ontology and metaphysics. Heidegger's deconstruction of Aristotle's philosophy is meant to lay bare the Greek bases of the meaning of Being as Being-produced (and of the relations "active-passive", "subject-object") and **to open the way for a more originary, existential** understanding of man as *Dasein*, which starts from the **irreducible** meaning of Being as it is manifested by *Dasein* itself through the development of a hermeneutics of its own situation. Thus, Heidegger's deconstructive interpretations of Aristotle's *poiesis* are the necessary accompanying step for a real phenomenological analysis of man's Being.

I will firstly discuss Heidegger's interpretation of the Aristotelian term *ousia* ("substance", "essence"), which Heidegger understands hermeneutically, by taking into account its everyday meaning: "possessions." This philosophical widening of the meaning was possible because of the tendency of the practical man to take something as something by viewing it within a certain scope and always with a certain aim: "good for...", "inappropriate for...", etc. By understanding it *as...*, man takes it into account and transforms it into a possession. This a priori appropriation (*Aneignung*) by way of circumspection (*Umsicht*) and practical wisdom aims at the aspect (*eidos*) of a thing, which is always seen *as...* Plato and Aristotle developed the philosophical meaning of *ousia* in order to emphasize the fact that pure theoretical sight concentrates *also* on the aspect of things (*eidos*), but with the sole aim of describing it. For the theoretical sight, not this or that being is important and is taken as such, but the *Being* of that being, i.e. the *ousia*. Thus, *ousia* implies the *conjunction* of the domain of philosophical inquiry (*ta onta* as obtained from *ta pragmata*, *ta poioumena*) and the philosophical discourse (*logos* as a taking into account of the *eidos* of *ta onta*). As Being of produced and manufactured beings, *ousia* is Being as Being-produced. "To be" means to be present – i.e. to be stable and self-standing as a result of the process of coming out of absence, i.e. as a result of pro-duction (*Her-gestelltsein*).

I will then focus on Heidegger's interpretations of the way in which Aristotle compares the two supreme faculties of the human soul, i.e. *phronesis* and *sophia*, and ascribes pre-eminence to the latter. By so doing, Aristotle only radicalizes the theoretical (contemplative) dimension already at work in *technē*, which is the knowledge guiding the *poiesis*. But, as Heidegger argues, by so doing Aristotle also abandons a very fruitful way of investigating the nature of practical wisdom (*phronesis*), which is in consonance with **man's** everyday understanding. Heidegger shows why Aristotle *had* to let *sophia* – as the knowledge of the movement of perfect beings – win the contest: because the (implicitly) guiding Greek meaning of Being was Being-constantly-present, Being-arrived-to-its-end (perfection) and self-standing. **Human being** and its peculiar mode of "movement" (as well as the knowledge, *phronesis*, that opens access to its first principles) fails to reach perfection.

PENCHEV VASIL DINEV. *Heidegger's Comment on Aristotle's Physics*.

One can interpret the "phenomena" in Husserl's sense as the existences ("existentia") of the "things themselves" or by themselves. Husserl rejected that approach as "naturalization" of his phenomenology. Heidegger himself, though revising or developing far further Husserl's phenomenology, refuted to be an "existentialist"; he attempted to interpret Greek philosophy, especially the Pre-Socratics, in that manner, in which the phenomenon (as "meaning it in itself by itself") might be identified as naïvely as wisely with the *being* (inseparable from the existence) of each certain thing.

The same approach of Heidegger penetrates his extended comment on a single fragment (B, 1) from Aristotle's *Physics*. The part in question refers to the concept of "Φύσις" at all, and Heidegger's reflection addresses the relation of that term in Greek philosophy and Aristotle's particularly to the modern European understanding of nature as opposed to both human being and technics.

Heidegger's way of interpretation merges the things and their Platonic "ideas" in the initial Φύσις thinkable as both χάος and ἀλήθεια. Heidegger means the latter as that truth relevant to both Greek and his philosophy: ἀλήθεια is ἀ-λήθεια, i.e. the appearance at all from hiddenness as un-hiddenness. That concept of truth is not underlain by any opposition to anything: it has not the form of the Latin *adaequatio*, the origin of which is often searched again in Aristotle.

Truth as ἀ-λήθεια is phenomenon as appearance where being and existence are both yet and initially inseparable from each other. Thus truth as ἀ-λήθεια is φύσις at the same. Nature is Truth before any opposition, particularly that of human being to nature.

Further, the Greek τέχνη is seen in the same way rather than in the modern manner as creating something artificial, technical, which has not existed in a natural way, and even it might not exist in nature in principle: τέχνη cannot be the modern technics at all.

On the contrary, τέχνη means the hidden essence to be revealed, literally the veil to be removed, and thus truth to be seen: τέχνη is not and cannot be opposed to φύσις, it assists for the human beings to be able to observe the φύσις in an obvious way. Aristotle's ἐντελέχεια is interpreted analogically and relatively to τέχνη.

TĂNĂSESCU ION. *The Aristotelian Polysemy of Being in Franz Brentano's Dissertation and the Origins of Intentionality.*

It is well known that Franz Brentano's dissertation *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle* (1862) played a decisive role in the genesis of the problem of being for the young Heidegger. On the other side, this work was never related to the genesis of the topic of intentionality in the School of Brentano. The aim of my speech is to fill this gap, and to show that Brentano's analysis of the Aristotelian polysemy of being in his dissertation can be regarded as an important historical source of the problem of intentional objects and intentionality in his School, including in Husserl's early phenomenology. The argument of this thesis is based on the following ideas:

1. For Brentano the expression "being in the sense of being true" is a polysemantic one, whose first and proper sense is the truth of a judgement.
2. Even this proper sense of truth is equivocal since in relation with it two senses can be distinguished: (a) "is true" said about the judgement as a whole, (b) "is true" in the sense of the copula which forms the judgement, as its veridical sense.
3. Brentano interprets this veridical sense in a conceptualist non-Aristotelian way arriving at a point where his analysis can be reconstructed in such a way that for him Aristotle referred not only to two, but to three distinct concepts of truth.
4. Requisite for this interpretation is the linking of the thesis: "the true is in affirmation, the false in negation", with the Thomistic-Averroist development of the Aristotelian polysemy of being at the level of being in the mind.
5. The realm of being in the mind made of objective concepts is a constitutive part of the traditional background of the problem of intentionality for Brentano and his students.

BORȚUN ILEANA. *The Existential Status of Friendship. A Phenomenological Perspective on Aristotle's Philia.*

In my presentation, I will discuss Aristotle's account of friendship from the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Despite that, initially, Aristotle includes one's friends among those "external goods" that are needed for one's happiness but are not part of it (hence the term "external"), in the Books VIII-IX he determines friendship as an ethical virtue, i.e. as an important part of one's happiness. Moreover, the virtue of friendship seems to have a special status, since it is discussed at such length.

Starting from Aristotle's account, I intend to argue that friendship can be considered as the ethical, *authentic* relationship with both oneself and the other and that this fundamental status of friendship becomes more clear when seen in connection with the existential analysis of conscience from Heidegger's *Being and Time* and with Arendt's account of the relation between thinking and conscience (the latter being understood as friendship with oneself) from the first volume of *The Life of the Mind*.

I will start with (1) a detailed discussion of the Aristotelian analysis of friendship, showing the reasons why Aristotle could not consider friendship to be merely exterior to happiness, but had to rethink it as an important component of happiness. I will argue for this in three interconnected ways, by showing that: (a) the virtue of friendship springs naturally from being virtuous, given that, for Aristotle, only the virtuous man can be friends with himself and that friendship with oneself is a precondition of the friendship for another;

(b) friendship is a special virtue, that enables a better exercise of the other virtues; (c) the determination of friendship as an ethical virtue, i.e. as a component of happiness, captures precisely the fact that, for Aristotle, the happy man – even at the highest level, that of the philosopher – remains essentially a political being, meant to lead his life among his equals (in this case, among other virtuous men).

Given that Aristotle's account of friendship allows us to see it as a virtue that enables the exercise of the other virtues, I will continue by arguing that (2) friendship is *the* ethical or, in other words, *the* authentic relation itself. As I will show, this fundamental-existential status of friendship can be clarified in connection with Heidegger's determination of the call of conscience towards authenticity as "the voice of *the friend* whom every Dasein carries with it"⁶ and with Arendt's discussion of conscience as "the anticipation of the fellow who awaits you if and when you come home"⁷, i.e. to oneself.

D IACONU MARIN. *Moments and meanings of the presence of Aristotle's works in the history of Romanian philosophy / Momente și semnificații ale prezenței operei lui Aristotel în istoria filosofiei românești.*

In the culture from Romanian Principalities, the Aristotle's philosophy arrives to be better known just at the beginning of 18th century, through the Princely Academies from Bucharest and Iasi. Since the second part of 19th century, Aristotle's small works are translated and several university dissertations are presented and published (in classical philology and philosophy). The increasing of Aristotle's presence is slow because until the reform of educational system from 1948, the courses on history of Greek philosophy were not taught in the faculties of philosophy. Aristotle imposes considerably himself in the second part of 20th century, by the translation of his important works and the publishing of a number of monographs. Translators: Șt. Bezdechi, N. I. Barbu, D. M. Pippidi, M. Florian, and others. Authors of monographs: D. Bădăraș, D. Isac, Gh. Vlăduțescu, and others.

C ERNICA VIOREL. *Research of Syllogism in Romanian Philosophy / Cercetarea silogismului în filosofia românească.*

The discourse from this paper has two goals: the outline of concept "normal syllogistic system", and the illustration of two main directions of its researches: in limits of Aristotelian logic, and with certain means of symbolic logic. Țuțugan's syllogistic system with negative terms, and Moisil's relational syllogistic system will be presented. Finally, the author will set out, on the basis of judgment of predication, some conditions of possibility for a pre-judicative hermeneutics.

⁶ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time* [1927] (trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson). Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962, p. [163] (my emphasis).

⁷ Hannah Arendt, *The Life of the Mind*, vol. I: "Thinking" (ed. Mary McCarthy). New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978, p. 191.

A SLAM CONSTANTIN. *Between the Ares's logic and Hermes's logic. Constantin Noica: an Aristotelian?/ Între logica lui Ares și logica lui Hermes. Constantin Noica: un aristotelician?*

In this paper, I try to point out, on the one hand, several cultural (not only formal) differences between the two kinds of logic which Noica talks about in one of his books: *Letters on the logic of Hermes*, and on the other hand, some similarities of the two Logics. These differences are as important as the similarities, and I ask a natural question: Is Noica an Aristotelian in this respect of his projected logic? I argue the idea that formally he is, but if we pay attention to Noica's intention, and to his explicit goal, namely to construct a logic of culture, the answer cannot be affirmative.

B UICAN ALEXANDRU. *Reception of Aristotle's works in Interwar Romanian thinking/ Receptarea operei lui Aristotel în gândirea românească interbelică.*

The goal of this work is to find out the way the Aristotelianism was developed in Romanian philosophy and the manner of perceiving Aristotle's works in our cultural environment. We will consider not only the accurate references to his works, but also the Aristotelian roots of some Romanian philosophers. Also, we will follow Aristotle's influence in our culture taking into consideration mostly the interbelic period.

L ATEȘ TITUS. *Aristotle and the Hermes's logic/ Aristotel și logica lui Hermes.*

In the 1980s Romanian philosopher Constantin Noica wrote a series of twenty-seven letters on the "logic of Hermes", which was based on the idea of a logical field and according to which *the whole was in the part* and not only the part was in the whole. Noica believed this idea could have been conceived by any ancient logician if he had not had to face Aristotle's logic, already formed. Noica thought that no matter how we want to treat Aristotle, one fact remained: that in any presentation of the syllogism, the part is in the whole, or the 'character' (attribute) is transported by the middle term into a whole. Noica's hermeneutical logic is constituted as logic of the sciences of the spirit which involve "values" that also use indirect ways of speech as requests, questions or imperative statements, all of which were banished from logic by Aristotle because they could be neither true or false.

My intention in this paper is to show that, despite these differences of opinion, Noica found in Aristotle's works a number of valid points for his own philosophical construction such as: the capture of the individual and the knowledge of the general, the role of the significance in causal explanation in *Posterior Analytics*, the putting of Being as "theme" in *Metaphysics*, narration as a descriptive modality in *History of Animals*. Noica was very attentive to the true meaning of Aristotle's concepts, he developed a number of suggestions and assumptions from Aristotle's texts, thus proving, not only the shortcomings but also the richness and timeliness of the ideas of Aristotle's philosophy.

A LTMANN FRANZ-LOTHAR. *Aristotle and Significances of his Political Philosophy for Today.*

Among the various treatises of Aristotéles those on Political Philosophy can very easily be related and discussed in contemporary times when we encounter so many different ethical, political and constitutional settings in our globalizing world. A principal

statement of his was that “man is by nature a political animal”. Not all of A’s thoughts in the broader field of Ethics and Political Philosophy can be appreciated and accepted nowadays, like e.g. his justification of slavery or his views on women, whom he wants to remain subordinated to men because her faculty of judgement is weaker than that of men!

Over the centuries A’s thoughts, findings and recommendations have been discussed, often very controversially, and his intellectual influence underwent some kind of ‘business cycles’. But it can be easily found that even Islamic theologians, like also Western Christian theologians, have referred to A’s philosophy. It is further said that for example Friedrich Nietzsche has relied intensively on A’s philosophical deliberations.

However, as a scholar of Platon he had developed very interesting basic perceptions concerning the build-up, the constituent parts and the purpose, the objectives, of a (at that time city-) state (polis). He already stated that the characteristic feature of a distinct state is the constitution, and consequently he developed a theory of constitutions with two basic questions: Who reigns, and for whose benefit? The therefrom existing classification of bad and good constitutions is still worth to be discussed with students, although over the centuries the qualitative assessments have undergone some changes! His assessment that democracy does not belong to the good constitutions, but is only less bad than tyranny and oligarchy, has been often taken as an excuse or even justification for upholding undemocratic, half-dictatorial régimes. Also one of his secondary thoughts in this context remains until today of utmost relevance: the desired stability of a state construct, and whether a monarchy or an aristocracy (where the good ones govern) might be better. Worth of discussion certainly is his statement that often it is not possible to establish in a peculiar state an absolutely best constitution. The prosed paper will concentrate on those parts of Aristotéles’ philosophical reflections which deal with the specific field of relations between citizens themselves (man and wife, master and slave), but in particular with the fact that human beings by nature live in communities (zoon politikon), and what results from this for the construct of political entities.

B OBOC ALEXANDRU. *Aporetics and Dialectics : Aristotle and Nicolai Hartmann / Aporetica și dialectica la Aristotel și Nicolai Hartmann.*

My research is based on a comparison between the two types of aporetics, in their close relation with the dialectics and the apodictics, in order to restructure Hartmann’s concept of “apodictics” an his perspective on examining philosophical concers.

B ĂNȘOIU ION. *Aristotle’s Divisions of Sciences / Clasificarea științelor la Aristotel.*

The division of sciences is, generally, a marginal topic for Aristotle’s philosophical reflections, since the very few analysis on this direction were devoted to the attempt to determine the senses of the so-called “scientific faith”. I will investigate the possibilities to understand Aristotle’s reflections on the ‘systema’ of his main philosophical treatises as a proper manner to come closer to the antique problem regarding the divisions of sciences.

P OPESCU DRAGOȘ. *Neo-aristotelianism at Princely Academies of Bucharest and Jassy / Neoaristotelismul Academiiilor Domnești din București și Iași.*

The paper presents the main aspects of the establishing and functioning of the two higher education institutions in the capital cities of the Romanian Principalities (Moldavia and Wallachia) in XVIIth and XVIIIth Centuries.

At the Princely Academies of Bucharest and Jassy, the education was held in Greek (the recognized language for culture and religion in the former regions of the Byzantine Empire), many teachers being Greek language speakers, while the students were mainly of Romanian upper class origin or Orthodox Christians from the Ottoman Empire.

There are two important periods in the functioning of the Princely Academies: 1. The Neo-Aristotelian Period (around 1700-around 1770); 2. The Enlightenment Period (around 1770-1821). The paper analyses the first period, with a special focus on the philosophical disciplines taught in the respective time.

B ĂLAN MARIN. *Interpretarea Categoriilor lui Aristotel în Evul Mediu. Cazul lui Thoma de Aquino.*

In medieval philosophical education, every problem is associated with the authoritative texts read in schools. Many philosophical problems were discussed within the framework of teaching the *Categories*; the rediscovery of the Aristotelian corpus in the 12th century and its incorporation into the university programs, despite the fact that it considerably expanded the area of the authority texts for identifying philosophical problems, it did not lead to the neglect of the *Categories*, the scholars of the 13th and 14th centuries continuing to write commentaries for this classical text. Thoma d'Aquino did not write a commentary on Aristotle's *Categories*, but his comments to other Aristotelian works (eg. *Physics* or *Metaphysics*), the two *Summae*, the treaty *De ente et essentia* contain extensive analysis dedicated to the subject of categories. In this study will present the interpretation of *Categories* as a work of logics, in the 13th century, a period marked by the emergence of the theory of the secondary intentions, focusing on the contributions of Thoma d'Aquino on this matter.

T OTU SAVU. *Reason, language and Aristotle's Metaphysics.*

My paper will put into question a problem that linguists and philosophers of language have discussed it with passion and maximum accuracy: the problem of expressing the philosophical thinking through the categories of language. Starting from a notorious study of the linguist Emile Benveniste, I will try to explain the manner in which Aristotle's philosophical thinking depends, indeed, on the categories of language, even though we cannot singularize the philosophical thinking by this structure of categorial expression. In short, I will try to argue that philosophy is more than the ordinary linguistic expression of our thinking.

C ONSTANTINESCU MIHAELA. *Where is Aristotle When We Need Him? On the Very Grounds of Ascribing Moral Blame to Individual and Corporate Agents.*

With the recent proliferation of corporate scandals such as BP Deepwater Horizon, Volkswagen Group or FIFA, to name but a few, highlighting the intertwined relationship

between individual and corporate moral failure, the return to Aristotelian thought concerning conditions for ascribing moral blame seems to be more appropriate than ever. On the background of the individualist-collectivist debate inquiring whether we have good grounds to ascribe moral responsibility not only to individuals working within an organisation, but also to organisations *per se*, these conditions laid down by Aristotle in his *Nicomachean Ethics* have been used by various scholars to prove either the capacity or incapacity of organisations to act as moral agents (De George, 1999; Bovens 1998; Corlett 2001; De Leede, Nijhof and Fisscher 1999; French 1979; Donaldson 1982; Goodpaster and Matthews 2001; Keely 1970; Ladd 1979; Makela 2007; Soares 2003; Velasquez, 1983; Wilmot, 2001). This paper discusses the way organisations and individuals composing them may be ascribed moral blame within a virtue-ethics, Aristotelian framework, taking into account the specific status of secondary moral agents displayed by organisations, as well as how this enables them to meet the Aristotelian criteria for attributions of moral blame. Namely, the paper argues that, given the fact that organisations act through the individuals composing them, assessing the way they meet the Aristotelian conditions may be rightly done by evaluating how corporate practices influence the ethical behaviour of employees. Therefore, in order to ascribe moral responsibility to organisations, the paper refers to the Corporate Ethical Virtues Model (Kaptein, 1998; 2011) and assesses the level of ethical virtues embedded within the corporate practices.

The main contribution of the paper consists in developing a framework for ascribing moral blame to both individuals and corporations, by linking Aristotelian criteria for attributions of moral blame to individuals, with the Corporate Ethical Virtues Model for attributions of moral blame to organisations, finally managing to enlarge our individualist conception on moral responsibility so as to create room for corporate morality.

MOR SEGEV. *Aristotle on Group Agency.*

One central issue in contemporary social philosophy is the question of whether or not groups, such as corporations or countries, can constitute agents having their own minds and actions which are not reducible to the minds and actions of their constituent individual members. In my paper, I investigate Aristotle's view of the nature and identity of the *polis*, and argue that, with some differences, this view supports (and of course prefigures) the line of those philosophers who argue in favor of the existence of such collective agents today (e.g. Pettit and List).

In Aristotle's theory, the *polis*, like any other hylomorphic compound, consists of matter (its citizenry) and a form (its constitution). Aristotle thinks of constitutions as determining the particular way in which citizens are arranged so as to function as members of a *polis*. As Aristotle himself recognizes, this conception of the *polis* is analogous to his conception of a living organism, whose soul similarly determines the arrangement of its bodily parts according to their functions. Similarly, in just the way that Aristotle thinks the actions of human beings are determined by their souls, he also speaks of those actions which are determined by the constitution of the *polis* as "actions of the *polis*" (*Pol.* III.3, 1276a13-16). In Aristotle's view, then, the *polis* is a collective agent, whose guiding principle and behavior cannot be reduced to the minds or actions of its individual constituent members.

Furthermore, Aristotle attributes to *poleis* judgement, deliberation, virtue (or vice) and happiness (or unhappiness), which suggests that he thinks of *poleis* not simply as agents, but rather as moral agents responsible for their actions (contra e.g. Gerson). Aristotle's view is indeed quite radical on this issue, by comparison to contemporary theories, as it even ascribes to *poleis* emotions and feelings. Finally, Aristotle's view of group agency sheds light on an ongoing debate concerning his philosophy of mind. Functionalist interpretations are often criticized for committing Aristotle to the multiple realizability of mental states. But since Aristotle thinks certain mental states are realized in beings as diverse as individual humans and *poleis*, that criticism fails.

B AZAC ANA. *Aristotle, The Names of Vices and Virtues: What is the Criterion of Quantitative Evaluation of the Moral Behaviour?*

As we know, in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle has given a tableau of the desirable virtues and their infringement through the surpassing of their limits. Thus, every virtue was framed or delimited by vices that represent either its excess or its deficiency. Vices appear as either *too much* or *too little* of the virtues, an apparently quantitative manner to tackle them. However, this type of defining is related to deep metaphysical reasons: since every (especially) living being has its *telos*, since man's *telos* is to practise and fulfil his human specific – reason – it results that the excess or deficiency in his behaviour pervert and even stop the realisation of the humanity of man. And this humanity is, in turn, in accordance to the *telos* of nature, the *good* in and for the preservation of all things. If, hypothetically, the human persons would not be virtuous at all, this accordance would not be realised and man would be an accident in the logic of nature: and accidents are removed, sooner or later. The criterion of the “quantitative” moral evaluation is thus qualitative: a quality, *the good aimed at by mindfulness* applied to the concrete particular moral relations and learned from experience.

The presentation starts with the meanings of names, continues with the sketch of the method and criteria used by Aristotle in order to describe the moral values promoted within the human behaviours, and after the examples of some values without names in the picture of virtues and vices, is stopping at the metaphysical reason of Aristotle's method of proposing the tableau of moral conducts. The human function and the human *telos* lead to the importance of the intermediate/the mean in this tableau, and to its specific, *metaphysically*, as quality (not as a quantity on the scale of quantities).

Developing his “table” of virtues and vices, Aristotle has suggested at least two philosophical patterns of thinking: one is the *dialectics of quantity and quality*, the other – the *ontological triadicty* (the deficiency, the appropriate, the excess). And the fact that some moral attitudes have no names is just the result of this dialectics and triadicty. But by drawing attention over it, Aristotle once more has demonstrated the social character of the moral values and the moral value of the socially shared life.

L IANU COSTIN. *Aristotelian semantics, homo economicus, images and brands.*

Aristotle's general theory of meaning is describing for the first time relations among linguistic signs, mental images, and real things. Centuries later, the triangle of meaning or the semiotic triangle became a model of how linguistic symbols are related to the objects they represent (1923 Ogden and Richards). However, the triangle can be traced back

to the 4th century BC, in Aristotle's *Organon*. But the Triangle relates to the problem of universals, a philosophical debate which split ancient and medieval philosophers (mainly realists and nominalists) or is going beyond that? Are universals mental images and how important are them in relation to the objects?

This paper is reviewing the way Aristotle was looking into the causes of human action and especially the way he understood the philosophical images and action based on them, especially from an economic prospective. To the word *phantasia* (De Anima 3.3) he attached different meanings. In one way it is suggested to represent capacity of the human brain to produce images. Another explanation developed by Aristotle is as appearances, which may be understood as illusions as we will try to argue. There are several forms of images and philosophical approaches to explain their phenomenology. One may think that Aristotle was wrong in defining *phantasia* both image and illusion. Even more, looking at images through the lenses of *homo economicus*, there specific understandings of images as drivers of market forces through brands and branding. In this perspective *phantasias*, are sort of image which are producing effects as we will argue in this paper.

Our conclusion, based on re-visiting Aristotle from a philosophical approach of both images and brands, as market entities, is that illusions and images are part of an imaginary world, produced by our brain even if we pretend to act like *homo economicus* based on the purpose of the self interest, as Aristotle putted even long time before John Stuart Mills. Taking the form brands, they have the capacity to impose and influence action and to change behavior of individuals and societies, ideas which fits exceptionally to the Aristotelian ancient thoughts. Even more, from an economic prospective, brands as images are more in many cases more powerful compared with the related objects making perception a stronger new reality. Once re-visited ancient ideas pave the way for new philosophical understandings of our minds in action and interaction.

DIMITRIOS DENTSORAS. *Aristotle on Craft and Virtue.*

The essay examines Aristotle's account of the relationship between craft (*technê*) and virtue, drawing some conclusions regarding virtue's necessity and sufficiency for happiness. The parallel between virtue and crafts appears a number of times in the Platonic works. There, Socrates presents virtue as a kind of knowledge or expertise that aims at, and unfailingly succeeds in, making someone happy. Although the craft analogy occupies an important position in Socratic ethics, it faces number of difficulties, of which Aristotle seems to be aware. Some have to do with the idea that virtue as a whole is a kind of knowledge or expertise (a claim that Socrates only argues for inconclusively). Others concern the relationship between virtue (considered as some sort of craft) and happiness.

Aristotle also discusses craft in his ethical writings, where *technê* is listed as one of the intellectual virtues; he also examines in detail crafts such as rhetoric and tragic poetry, with the apparent goal of training competent (i.e. virtuous) orators and poets. But Aristotle notes a number of important differences between virtue and craft. One has to do with the fact that, contrary to Socrates, Aristotle believes that virtue is not merely knowledge or an intellectual expertise (as the crafts are), but that it also includes non-intellectual moral qualities. Moreover, craft is distinct from the intellectual virtue *par excellence*, practical wisdom (*phronêsis*), since it is concerned with production, rather than with action. To this, one can

add the fact that, while many crafts function according to a blueprint model, in which a set of instructions is supposed to lead one to the completion of a task, such as building a house or healing a patient, virtue is responsive to circumstances in a way that resists any blueprint.

I discuss these Aristotelian reservations about the analogy between virtue and craft, and I draw some conclusions regarding happiness and the way that virtue leads to it. While, in the case of the crafts, their final product seems to be something separate from the craft itself, the product of virtue, i.e. happiness, is nothing other than virtuous activity. At the same time, virtuous activity is dependent on a supply of external goods, some of which are themselves products of craft. I examine Aristotle's complex picture of how virtue leads to happiness, and draw some contrasts between it and the account we get through the craft analogy in Plato.

KAZATUKA INAMURA. *The Eleatic Stranger's Method in Aristotle's Eudemian Ethics.*

In the recent scholarly literature, it is often argued whether Aristotle uses a dialectical method when he formulates the first principle of ethics, i.e. the concept of human happiness, and what epistemological background his method for formulating ethical concepts has. In this paper, I will address these problems by considering first how he uses a dialectical method in the *Eudemian Ethics* [EE]. Usually, the endoxic method (expressed in EE VI.1=*Nicomachean Ethics* [NE] VII.1 1145b2–7) is construed as embodying 'the' dialectical argument, even though it is just one form of dialectics. I will draw attention to another dialectical method, less known in the modern-day scholarly literature: the influence of a Platonic method in the *Statesman* on Aristotle's *Eudemian* methodological passage. In EE I.6 1216b26–35, he says, 'If we start from what is truly yet not clearly spoken, clarity will be won as we make progress'. This expression comes from Plato's *Statesmen* 275a and 281d. Aristotle then seems to adopt the Eleatic stranger's method in two ways to clarify the initial ambiguous statement that happiness is the greatest and best of human goods; first, he draws a wide variety of distinction, such as whether good things are achievable by human action or not, and second, he refers to appearances as illustrations in order to clarify more abstract ethical concepts (cf. EE II.1 1220a15–18, EE V.1= NE VI.1 1138b25–26, *De Anima* II.2 413a11–13). This Platonic method will enable us to illuminate the characteristics of Aristotle's method for formulating ethical concepts in both EE and NE. I will then discuss that this approach is not exactly identical with the standard Aristotelian doctrine that we should start from what is known to us or what is less known by nature in order to recognize what is known by nature without qualifications. Rather, the starting point of the Platonic method is a true but vague statement, which is verified or reformulated into a principle known by nature with reference to things known to us. Thus, the standard Aristotelian doctrine is one element of this Platonic method. In the paper, I will examine such a Platonic background, explore similarities and differences between Aristotle's two ethical treatises, and consider the epistemological background or framework for his dialectical method of ethics.

EŞANU ANDREEA. *Remarks on Aristotle's Notion of Virtue.*

In *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle defines virtue (*arete*) as a kind of "mean". Courage, for example, is understood as a sort of mean between reckless bravery and cowardice. In

many cases, when a person is said to be courageous in an ethical sense, a certain margin is tolerated: sometimes it is wiser to be able to take some risks while in others, to be prudent. Also, some actions are easier to be placed in the mean, while others not quite. It is hard, for example, to draw a perfectly sharp boundary between justifiable over prudence and hesitation. So, virtues, when practiced, behave like fuzzy notions. From this standpoint, Aristotle's ethical claim can be taken to be as follows: by training virtues and correcting bad inclinations (*i.e.* by learning to get near the mean), human agents are more likely to engage in courses of action that serve ethical ends.

In the following, I will discuss an objection of vagueness with regard to this last claim. Elizabeth Anscombe famously rejects Aristotle's notion of virtue arguing that it is only vaguely related to that of ethical action. In order to carry out this discussion, I will advance a distinction. An ethical action may be seen in two different ways: (i) it is something that does not require reflection: an action is performed based on some previous training, like brushing teeth twice a day; I don't need to reflect on the benefits of brushing in order to do what is right; I just do it because I managed to correct an inclination to be lazy and irresponsible that I had as a child; (ii) it is something that requires reflection (and some kind of grounding): I keep telling myself that I must brush teeth and not be lazy, because it is good for me, in order to actually do it. If acting ethically is more like in (ii) than like in (i), at least in some cases, then one has to figure out how virtue (*i.e.* the training in doing what is right) is related to deliberation (*i.e.* to the establishing of what is right) and to action (*i.e.* to the motivating to do what is right). I maintain that the relationship between virtue and ethical deliberation is not vague, although it involves vague notions, while the relationship between ethical deliberation and action is vague in Aristotle's ethics.

IOVAN DREHE. *The Role of Dialectic in Aristotle's Discussion of Political Regimes.*

It is widely accepted in the Aristotelian scholarship that Aristotle employed a dialectical method in the sciences (e.g. starting with G.E.L. Owen's '*Tithenai ta Phainomena*' in 1961). However, questions regarding the exact nature of this dialectical method still require a lot of considerations. Is this simply the '*endoxal method*' (e.g. as presented by J. Barnes in his *Aristotle and the Method of Ethics*, 1980) where contradictions are eliminated in order to obtain a coherent scientific account of the studied subject-matter? Or, is it more than that?

To answer these questions, this paper shall focus: 1. for theoretical insights - on Aristotle's discussion of dialectical instruments (*organa*; *Top.* I, 13); 2. for practical examples - on Aristotle's discussion of constitutions, to be found in the *Politics* (III, IV). For instance, it is fairly clear that in *Pol.* II, where he discusses constitutions, existent or conceived, he employs the endoxal method. If we turn to his discussion on political regimes, their classification (although some prefer the term 'taxonomy' since Aristotle divides into 'natural kinds') and their subdivisions, the same might not apply, because it seems that the endoxal method was not devised to tackle questions of classification or taxonomy, although it makes use of them. For this kind of work, other dialectical tools are needed.

Thus, the aim of this paper is to show in what manner Aristotle's methodology is dialectical in the case of his classification of political constitutions. For this, I will take the following steps: 1. At first, I will discuss how does dialectic apply to empirical sciences, with a special focus on empirical information related to constitutions; 2. Then I will point out the

fact that the endoxical method, even though it plays a central role, cannot function without the prime matter of endoxa, i.e. dialectical premises; 3. To find premises, you need dialectical instruments (*organa*; of these, the 3rd and the 4th, dealing with the finding of similarities and differences among things, are of particular relevance); 4. Then I will illustrate in what manner these instruments contribute to premise formation in the special case of the theory of political regimes. 5. Finally, I will try to underline the interpretative potential and importance of this dialectical reading.

NICA DANIEL. *Was Aristotle a Moral Particularist?*

Moral particularism is an ethical view, according to which there are no defensible moral principles, and the moral valence of a feature is context-dependent. As a result, the moral person is not the one who applies general rules to particular cases, but the one who has a kind of moral perspicacity that allows him to identify the right answer to a moral problem. In defending moral particularism, some philosophers (J. McDowell, J. Dancy etc.) have argued that moral particularism is not at all a novel and irrational doctrine, but in fact it is rooted in Aristotle's ethics. For contemporary particularists, the context-sensitivity of virtue, the moral sagacity of the *Phronimos*, and the flexible character of practical wisdom seemed to be good arguments in favor of labeling Aristotle as the first particularist. In my paper, I will discuss the limits of this claim, and I will analyze the different set of presuppositions, which underlie Aristotle's ethics and respectively moral particularism.

REAZU REMUS. *Phenomenological Approach to Aristotle's Concept of Priority.*

Starting mainly from Aristotle, *Categories*, 12, I will talk in my presentation about priority (*próteron*). I will connect the mentioned passage with Aristotle's elaborations from *Metaphysics*, V, 11. Although I will not limit myself to those passages, they represent the core on which this interpretation relies. Beyond this descriptive exposition, I aim to interpret the significations of priority using some suggestions from the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. I believe that the significations of priority can be better brought to light starting from the Husserlian *Lebenswelt* and the Heideggerian developments of *In-der-Welt-sein*. With these hermeneutical instruments, I will show that Aristotle's approach is rather non-metaphysical, unlike the traditional commentaries that emphasise the metaphysical aspect. These non-metaphysical significations are taken out directly from the stream of life. Although there is a certain hierarchical arrangement (especially in *Metaphysics*, V, 11), all these modes of priority must be brought to a proper systematic understanding. This requires us to show its guiding principle, which secures both its systematisation and its grounding. I will try to undertake such a systematisation, by referring to the structure of intentionality (or, in Heideggerian terms, the structure of existentiality). I propose thusly to bring into the present some of Aristotle's ideas, which, phenomenologically worked out, can prove themselves productive for contemporary inquiries.

S IMIONESCU-PANAIT ANDREI. *Retracing phantasy in Aristotle's notion of self-movement.* Like the air in between the gazing eye and the objects in its sight (*De anima*), Aristotle's *De Motu Animalium* can be understood as an intermediary between the Aristotelian works on nature and his Nicomachean Ethics. If so, the key between *physis* and virtue, both taken as ongoing acts, can only be found in the flux of animation. *De Motu Animalium* (in the text's intention), along with its central notion of "self-movement," can be understood as *both* epistemological and ethical. Throughout this presentation, I am showcasing Martha Nussbaum's reading of this epistemic-ethical tension in Aristotle's "self-movement." Her investigation disclosed an idea: the phenomenon of animal phantasy persists as the driving (constitutive) force behind "choices," amid cascading "self-movement." Towards the end of the presentation, I place this reading of phantasy against Husserl's classical notion, in the light of his concepts of kinaesthesia and motivation. We would witness Aristotle's attenuated "phenomenology," as it ricochets back into Husserl's own phenomenology, to no insignificant consequences.

B EJINARIU ALEXANDRU. *Between logos and phōnē. The Question of the Animal in Martin Heidegger's Reading of Aristotle.* The phenomenological method, although one of many other methods of approaching the Aristotelian texts and problems, can offer a significant contribution to the contemporary scholar debate. In my talk, I prove this by identifying the main results obtained by the phenomenological approach of the subject of animality in Aristotle's writings. In order to do so, I begin by discussing Heidegger's interpretation of the Aristotelian distinction between *logos* and *phōnē* (in his lecture course *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie*, GA18, §9) as modalities of being-in-the-world and being-with. Secondly, I investigate the way in which Heidegger – starting from certain passages in *De Anima* – shows in one of his later lecture courses, "Aristoteles, Metaphysik Theta 1–3. Von Wesen und Wirklichkeit der Kraft (GA33)", that for Aristotle the animal can have access to a specific kind of *phronēsis*.

In recent years strong criticism has emerged concerning the widespread understanding of the animal in its total opposition to the human, as an alterity lacking *logos*, incapable of any sort of comprehension and responsibility, capable only, like a mechanism, of reaction. This criticism holds that the metaphysical account of animality derives from Aristotle's definition of human as *zoon logon echōn*. Thus, it considers Aristotle as a decisive turning point for establishing a violent metaphysical difference between human and animal. However, I argue that Heidegger's phenomenological interpretations reveal that Aristotle's understanding of animality was more subtle, having finer distinctions and more nuances, and radically different from that of the modern Cartesian thought, which sees the animal as a machine or automaton. Still, in the history of philosophy, Aristotle's original view went through many different interpretations, translations and metaphysical alterations, misunderstandings, simplifications or levelling.

The goal of the phenomenological reading is the understanding and appropriation of the Aristotelian thought, starting from the basic experience in which the latter is grounded. Thus, concepts like *logos*, *zoē*, *phronēsis*, *aisthēsis* or *psyche* – as well as their nexuses – can be put in a new light and, accordingly, rethought. I investigate, hence, the voice (*phōnē*) of the animal and if it can - being distinct from speech, word, and concept - function for the animal

as an orientation instrument (indicating, calling, or warning). I also evaluate the concept of a surrounding world (*Umwelt*) in the case of animals, as well as attempt to identify the phenomena that determined Aristotle to separate *logos* and *phōnē*. Furthermore, I discuss the significance of the human having (*echei*) the word. As shown in my talk, the answers offered by Heidegger's interpretations of Aristotle can lead to a more profound and original understanding of the Stagirit's thought, as well as to developing new research paths regarding what one may call "the animal phenomenon".

CĂLIN ȘTEFAN. *Heidegger's hermeneutics of Aristotle's physics.*

In 1939-1940 Heidegger published "On the essence and concept of *Physis* (Aristotle, Physics, B1)", where through a creative translation of Aristotle's text and a hermeneutics of greek language he tried to regain a primary understanding of *physis*. His study's focus shifts the concept of *physis* beyond traditional dualities like nature-spirit, nature-technology, nature-art.

In the following essay I aim to bring up a question which Heidegger does not sufficiently explore – how can we, after regaining the primary understanding, go from the *physis* in 'Physics' to understanding the whole of being as *physis*. Heidegger notes that originally the Greeks experience being as *physis*, thus this word utters the whole of being. But Aristotle begins the book B of 'Physics' through a cut among beings: "Of beings (as a whole) some are from *physis*, whereas others are by other 'causes.'"¹ Heidegger does not question the division of beings through *physis* operated by Aristotle, although it is the one that makes the whole discourse of 'Physics' possible. *Physis* is improperly restricted to a specific domain of beings because, as Heidegger himself remarks, in it the whole of being is uttered. And yet Heidegger seems contempt to tacitly accept this division because in its horizon independent concepts like *ousia*, *kinesis*, *arche*, etc. revolve within a hermeneutic/meta-physics to which he himself adheres – that of presence. The cut made here proposes a beginning supported by primary oppositions resting within the *dynamics* of a traditional couple. But how can *physis* truly be the beginning, *arche*, while uttering being sometimes in part, sometimes as a whole. The hermeneutics of this beginning (which legitimizes a metaphysics) is possible only because of an *arche*-primary *arche*-beginning which can be thought only by seeing in *physis* – the *arche* for a part of being – just a trace of *physis* – the *arche* of the whole of being. Heidegger does not question Aristotle's reduction of pre-socratic greek thinking of *physis* and does only marginally underscore that only because the *physis* developed here is based upon an already thought *physis* the whole discourse is possible. Beyond inquiring the conditions of possibility of Aristotle's 'Physics', Heidegger "forgets" to legitimize the traces of the primary *physis* in these pages and as such "forgets" to question Aristotle's attitude towards the pre-socratic thinking of *physis* which has already seated itself in a pre-discursive fashion. So we aim to make sense of this *arche*-trace through a dual deconstruction. But it may well be that this strange "forgetfulness" of a thinking already thought goes beyond mere legitimizing of one's own discourse and to produce (through *hiding/forgetting*) a reflection on the way in which man experiences the totality of being, an experience of the whole which seems to require a double beginning: a primordial one structured by opposing dualities and an *arche*-primordial one, free of such oppositions.

TARARA GHEORGHE. *Anton Dumitriu on the Metaphysical Foundations of Aristotle's Logics / Temeiuri metafizice ale logicii aristotelice în viziunea lui Anton Dumitriu.*

In my paper I will present the manners in which Anton Dumitriu, as an important thinker of the Romanian philosophy reinforces, in his studies, the Aristotelian logic. I will explore the thesis of the Romanian philosopher, according to whom the nucleus of Aristotle's logic has a metaphysical origin. The relationship between logic and philosophy is placed, in this manner, in a new and original interpretative context. The challenges of my research are given by the limits and overcomes of the current analysis on the meta-scientific status of the Stagirit's logic.

POPA MIHAI. *The Concept of Entelechia in Blaga's perspective. Elements of Historical Anthropology / Conceptul de entelehie la Blaga. Elemente de antropologie istorică.*

In his work, Lucian Blaga often references classical Greeks and, particularly, concepts of Aristotle's philosophy. With regards to this study, we were interested in the concept of entelechy, as well as the context in which Blaga tackles said concept, in the volumes *Divine differentials* or *Historical being*. We want to undertake this discussion from the perspective of Blagian thought. Starting with the part dealing with the metaphysical and cultural view on history as basis, we could deepen some essential elements of the theory of style. We considered other concepts specific to Blaga's philosophy as well, such as: stylistic field or matrix, minus-knowledge, mystery, formative desire, etc.

GHEORGHE RADU. *Zoon politikon and the subjective welfare / Zoon politikon și bunăstarea subiectivă.*

In this article I will highlight the importance that the socio-historical context which a community interacts with new concepts should have; concepts that at the level of the common sense modelates further social practices, based on consensus and agreement. In any social dimension, there is a certain position that the significance of these concepts have, also determined by the inner dynamics of the paradigm that describes all these changes. According to Aristotle, the conformity with an ideal norm is represented not by the principal attribute of a good political regime, but by its adaptation to the concrete historical information. From this perspective, is the significance of the European integration process, as it is understood by the Romanian society, identical with that theoretically defined through the instruments of political philosophy? Is it possible that the involvement of the new European citizen in the games of language might have caused a different perception on the same concept? Based on Aristotle's political philosophy, I will construct the answers for these theoretical challenges.

VĂDANA MIHAI-DRAGOȘ. *Mircea Florian's notion of recessivity. A Romanian contribution to the Aristotelian topos of post-predicament / Noțiunea de recesivitate a lui Mircea Florian. O contribuție românească la topos-ul aristotelic al postpredicamentelor.*

Mircea Florian (1888-1960) treats on the notion of recessivity in the last of its works, *Recessivity as structure of the world*, posthumously published in 1983 and 1987. This notion

was suggested from biology where it explained an aspect of the heredity phenomenon, namely that certain characteristics, secondary, latent or hidden, of an organism come after (i.e. are recessive) its dominant, primary and manifest characteristics, to which are necessarily bound. However, Mircea Florian conceived recessivity as a structure of a set of ontologically significant notions. Following Florian's indication, this paper clarifies the notion of recessivity in relation to the Aristotelian post-predicaments (Categories, ch. 10-15). Accordingly, the first part aims to describe recessivity as a post-predicament notion. It is on this basis that the notion of recessivity is claimed to add a contribution to the Aristotelian post-predicaments. The second part goes further and clarifies what the recessive unity is. Being different from the categorial unity (also called by Florian unity of essence, or simply judicative synthesis of the form 'S is P'), the recessive unity helps us to understand why the Aristotelian post-predicaments form a topos both dependent and different from the topos of predicaments or categories. Thus, it is argued that Florian's recessivity consolidates the identity of the post-predicaments, giving an impetus to the contemporary research on the Aristotelian post-predicaments, on the reconstructions proper to their topos and on the wide range of experiences that this topos concerns.

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


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